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We consider approaches to brain dynamics and function that have been claimed to be Dar-
winian. These include Edelman’s theory of neuronal group selection, Changeux’s theory
of synaptic selection and selective stabilization of pre-representations, Seung’s Darwinian
synapse, Loewenstein’s synaptic melioration, Adam’s selﬁsh synapse, and Calvin’s replicat-
ing activity patterns. Except for the last two, the proposed mechanisms are selectionist but
not truly Darwinian, because no replicators with information transfer to copies and heredi-
tary variation can be identiﬁed in them. All of them ﬁt, however, a generalized selectionist
framework conforming to the picture of Price’s covariance formulation, which deliberately
was not speciﬁc even to selection in biology, and therefore does not imply an algorithmic
picture of biological evolution. Bayesian models and reinforcement learning are formally
in agreement with selection dynamics. A classiﬁcation of search algorithms is shown to
include Darwinian replicators (evolutionary units with multiplication, heredity, and variabil-
ity) as the most powerful mechanism for search in a sparsely occupied search space.
Examples are given of cases where parallel competitive search with information transfer
among the units is more efﬁcient than search without information transfer between units.
Finally, we review our recent attempts to construct and analyze simple models of true
Darwinian evolutionary units in the brain in terms of connectivity and activity copying of
neuronal groups. Although none of the proposed neuronal replicators include miraculous
mechanisms, their identiﬁcation remains a challenge but also a great promise.
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Edelman (1987) published a landmark book with Neural Darwin-
ism and The Theory of Neuronal Group Selection as its title and
subtitle, respectively. The view advocated in the book follows, in
general, arguably a long tradition, ranging from James (1890) up
to Edelman himself, operating with the idea that complex adap-
tations in the brain arise through some process similar to natural
selection (NS). The term“Darwinian”in the title cannot bemisun-
derstood to indicate this fact. Interestingly, the subtitle by the term
“group selection” seems to refer to a special kind of NS phenome-
non, called group selection [the reader may consult the textbook
byMaynard Smith (1998) formany of the concepts in evolutionary
biology that we use in this paper]. The expectation one has is then
that the mapping between aspects of neurobiology and evolution-
ary biology has been clearly laid out. This is rather far from the
truth,however. This is immediately clear from two reviews of Edel-
man’s book: one by Crick (1989), then working in neuroscience
and another by Michod (1988, 1990), an eminent theoretical evo-
lutionarybiologist. The appreciationby these authors of Edelman’s
work was almost diametrically opposite. Michod could not help
being bafﬂed himself. In a response to Crick he wrote; “Fran-
cis Crick concludes that ‘I have not found it possible to make a
worthwhile analogy between the theory of NS and what happens
in the developing brain and indeed Edelman has not presented
one’ (p. 246). This came as a surprise to me, since I had reached a
completely opposite conclusion” (Michod, 1990, p. 12). Edelman,
Crick, and Michod cannot be right at the same time. But they can
all be wrong at the same time. The last statement is not meant to
be derogatory in any sense: we are dealing with subtle issues that
do matter a lot! It is easy to be led astray in this forest of con-
cepts, arguments, models, and interpretations. We are painfully
aware of the fact that the authors of the present paper are by no
means an exception. The aim of this paper is fourfold: (i) to show
how all three authors misunderstood Darwinian dynamics in the
neurobiological context; (ii) to show that at least two different
meanings of the term “selection” are confused and intermingled;
(iii) to propose that a truly Darwinian approach is feasible and
potentially rewarding; and (iv) to discuss to what extent selection
(especially of the Darwinian type) can happen at various levels of
neurobiological organization.
We believe that a precondition to success is to have some pro-
fessional training in the theory (at least) of both the neural and
cognitive sciences as well as of evolution. Out of this comes a difﬁ-
culty: neurobiologists are unlikely to follow detailed evolutionary
arguments and, conversely, evolutionary biologists may be put off
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by many a detail in the neurosciences. Since the readership of this
paper is expected to sit in the neurobiology/cognitive science cor-
ner, we thought that we should explain some of the evolutionary
items involved in sufﬁcient detail. It is hard to deﬁne in advance
what “sufﬁcient” here means: one can easily end up with a book
(and one should), but a paper has size limitations. If this analysis
were to stimulate a good number of thinkers in both ﬁelds, the
authors would be more than delighted.
SOME ISSUES WITH “NEURAL DARWINISM”
Edelman argued for the applicability of the concepts of selection
at the level of neuronal groups. Put simply, it is a group of neurons
that have a sufﬁciently tightly knit web of interactions internally
so that they can be regarded as a cohesive unit (“a set of more or
less tightly connected cells that ﬁre predominantly together,”Edel-
man, 1987, p. 198), demonstrated by the fact that some groups
react to a given stimulus differentially, and groups that react better
get strengthened due to plasticity of the synapses in the group,
whereas others get weakened. There are two assumptions in the
original Edelman model: synaptic connections are given, to begin
with (the primary repertoire); and groups form and transform
through the modiﬁcations of their constituent synapses. Where
does selection come in?
As Crick (1989) noted: “What can be altered, however, is the
strength of a connection (or a set of connections) and this is taken
to be analogous to an increase in cell number in (for example) the
immune system. . . This idea is a legitimate use of the selectionist
paradigm. . . Thus a theory might well be called. . . ‘The theory of
synaptic selection (TSS)’. But this would describe almost all the-
ories of neural nets” (Crick, 1989, p. 241). We shall come back to
this issue because in the meantime TSS has advanced. Let us for
the time being assume that whereas a selectionist view of synapse
dynamics might be trivially valid, such a view at levels above the
synapse is highly questionable. Let us read Michod on the relation
between NS and neuronal group selection (NGS): “We can now
state the basic analogy between NS and NGS. In NS, differences in
the adaptation of organisms to an environment lead to differences
in their reproductive success, which, when coupled with rules of
genetic transmission, lead to a change in frequency of genotypes
in a population. In NGS, differences in receptive ﬁelds and con-
nectivity of neuronal groups lead to differences in their initial
responses to a stimulus, which, when coupled with rules of synap-
tic change, lead to a change in probabilities of further response
to the stimulus.” Note that reproductive success (ﬁtness) is taken
to be analogous to the probability of responding to a stimulus. It
should be clear that Michod thinks that the analogy is sufﬁciently
tight, although neuronal groups (and normally their constituent
neurons) do not reproduce. How can then NGS be Darwinian, one
might ask?What is meant by selection here?We propose that sense
can be made in terms of a special formalism, frequently used in
evolutionary biology, that of the eminent Price (1970), who made
two seminal contributions to evolutionary biology. One of them
is the Price equation of selection.
If it is possible to describe a trait (e.g., activation of a neuronal
group) and the covariance between that trait and its probability
of it occurring again in the future, then Price’s equation applies.
It states that the change in some average trait z is proportional to
the covariance between that trait zi and its relative ﬁtness wi in the
population and other transmission biases E (e.g., due to mutation,
or externally imposed instructed changes). . .
wΔz = cov (wi , zi) + E (wiΔzi) (1)
where w is average ﬁtness in the population. It is the ﬁrst term that
explains the tendency for traits that are positively correlated with
ﬁtness to increase in frequency. Note that there is no reference to
reproduction here, except through implication by the term “ﬁt-
ness” that is not necessarily reproductive ﬁtness in general. This
is a subtle point of the utmost importance, without the under-
standing of which it is useless to read this paper further. The Price
equation (in various forms) has been tremendously successful in
evolutionary biology, one of Price’s friends: Hamilton (1975) used
it also for a reformulation of his theory of kin selection (one of the
goals of which is to explain the phenomenon of altruism in evolu-
tion). Approaches to multilevel selection (acting, for example, at
the level of organisms and groups at the same time) tend to rely
on this formulation also (Damuth and Heisler, 1988). Note that
Michod is a former student of Hamilton, and that he is also an
expert on the theory of kin selection. Although he does not refer
to Price in the context of NGS, he does express a view that is very
much in line with the Price equation of selection.
One might suspect, having gotten thus far, that there is some
“trouble” with the Price equation, and indeed that is the case, we
believe, and this unrecognized or not emphasized feature has gen-
erated more trouble, including the problems around NGS. Let us
ﬁrst state, however, where we think the trouble is not. Crick (1990)
writes, responding to Michod: “It is very loose talk to call organ-
isms or populations ‘units of selection,’ especially as they behave in
rather different ways frombits of DNAor genes,which are genuine
units of selection. . .” This is an interesting case when the molecu-
lar biologist/neurobiologist Crick teaches something on evolution
to a professional evolutionary biologist. One should at least be
a bit skeptical at this point. If one looks at models of multilevel
selection, there is usually not much loose talk there, to begin with.
Second, Crick (without citation) echoes Dawkins’ (1976) view of
the selﬁsh gene. We just mention in passing the existence of the
famous paper with the title:“SelﬁshDNA: the ultimate parasite”by
Orgel and Crick (1980, where the authors ﬁrmly tie their message
to the view of the Selﬁsh Gene; Orgel and Crick, 1980). We shall
come back to the problems of levels of selection; sufﬁce to say it
here that we are not really worried about this particular concern
of Crick, at least not in general.
Our concern lies with the algorithmic deﬁciency of the Price
equation. The trouble is that it is generally “dynamically insufﬁ-
cient”: one cannot solve it progressively across an arbitrary number
of generations because of lack of the knowledge of the higher-
order moments: one ought to be able either to follow the fate of
the distribution of types (as in standard population genetics), or
have a way of calculating the higher moments independent of the
generation. This is in sharp contrast to what a theoretical physi-
cist or biologist would normally understand under “dynamics.”
As Maynard Smith (2008) explains in an interview he does “not
understand” the Price equation because it is based on an aggre-
gate, statistical view of evolution; whereas he prefers mechanistic
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models. Moreover, in a review of Dennett’s, 1995 book “Darwin’s
Dangerous Idea,” Maynard Smith writes: “Dennett’s central thesis
is that evolution by NS is an algorithmic process. An algorithm
is deﬁned in the OED as “a procedure or set of rules for calcu-
lation and problem-solving” (Maynard Smith, 1996). The rules
must be so simple and precise that it does not matter whether they
are carried out by a machine or an intelligent agent; the results
will be the same. He emphasizes three features of an algorithmic
process. First, “substrate neutrality”: arithmetic can be performed
with pencil and paper, a calculator made of gear wheels or tran-
sistors, or even, as was hilariously demonstrated at an open day
at one of the authors son’s school, jets of water. It is the logic
that matters, not the material substrate. Second, mindlessness:
each step in the process is so simple that it can be carried out
by an idiot or a cogwheel. Third, guaranteed results: whatever it is
that an algorithm does, it does every time (although, as Dennett
emphasizes, an algorithm can incorporate random processes, and
so can generate unpredictable results)”. Clearly, Price’s approach
does not give an algorithmic view of evolution. Price’s equation is
dynamically insufﬁcient. It is a very high level (a computational
level) description of how frequencies of traits should change as
a function of covariance between traits and their probability of
transmission, and other transmission bias effects that alter traits.
It does not constrain the dynamical equations that should deter-
mine transmission from one generation to another, i.e., it is not
an algorithmic description.
In fact, Price’s aim was to have an entirely general, non-
algorithmic approach to selection. This has its pros and cons. In
a paper published well after his death, Price (1995) writes: “Two
different main concepts of selection are employed in science. . .
Historically and etymologically, the meaning select (from se-
aside+ legere to gather or collect) was to pick out a subset from
a set according to a criterion of preference or excellence. This we
will call subset selection. . . Darwin introduced a new meaning
(as Wallace, 1916, pointed out to him), for offspring are not sub-
sets of parents but new entities, and Darwinian NS. . . does not
involve intelligent agents who pick out. . . These two concepts are
seemingly discordant. What is needed, in order to make possible
the development of a general selection theory, is to abstract the
characteristics that Darwinian NS and the traditional subset selec-
tion have in common, and then generalize” (Price, 1995, p. 390).
It is worth quoting Gardner (2008) who, in a primer on the Price
equation, writes: “The importance of the Price equation lies in its
scope of application. Although it has been introduced using bio-
logical terminology, the equation applies to any group of entities
that undergoes a transformation. But despite its vast generality,
it does have something interesting to say. It separates and neatly
packages the change due to selection versus transmission, giving
an explicit deﬁnition for each effect, and in doing so it provides
the basis for a general theory of selection. In a letter to a friend,
Price explained that his equation describes the selection of radio
stations with the turning of a dial as readily as it describes biologi-
cal evolution”(Gardner, 2008, p. R199). In short, the Price equation
was not intended to be speciﬁc to biological selection; hence it is no
miracle that it cannot substitute for replicator dynamics.
Before we move on we have to show how this generalized view
of selection exactly coincides with the view of how the neuronal
groups of Edelman are thought to increase or decrease in weight
(Figure 1).
A population P of beakers contains amounts wi of solution of
varying concentrations xi (dark= high concentration, light= low
concentration). In standard selection for higher concentration liq-
uid, low concentration liquids have a lower chance of transmission
to the next generation P′ (top two rows). In “Darwinian selec-
tion” two elements are added. The ﬁrst is the capacity for property
change (or transmission bias), see row 3 in which the liquid is
“mutated” between generations. The second is strengthening in
which the offspring can exceed parents in number and mass, see
row 4 in which the darkest liquid has actually increased in quan-
tity. To quote Price (1995): “Selection on a set P in relation to
property x is the act or process of producing a corresponding set
P′ in a way such that the amounts wi′ (or some function of them
such as the ratios wi′/wi) are non-randomly related to the corre-
sponding xi values.” (p. 392). The right side of Figure 1 shows
P P’
(weakening + 
property change)
(strengthening)
(weakening)
(no change)
P P’
FIGURE 1 |The general selection model of price (left) and its application to neuronal groups (right).
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one interpretation of neuronal groups within the same general
selection framework in which the traits are the pattern of connec-
tivity of the neuronal group, and the amounts are the probability
of activation of that neuronal group. In the top row there is no
change in the neuronal group between populations P and P′. In
the second row the neuronal group is weakened, shown as lighter
synaptic connections between neurons, although the trait (con-
nectivity pattern) does not change. In the third row the neuronal
group is weakened (reduced probability of being activated) but is
also “mutated” or undergoes property change (transmission bias)
with the addition of two new synaptic connections in this case. In
the ﬁnal row a neuronal group with the right connectivity but a
low probability of being activated gets strengthened. We conclude
that Edelman’s theory of NGS is ﬁrmly selectionist in this sense of
Price!
What is then the approach that is more mechanistic, suggestive
of an algorithm that could come as a remedy? We suggest it is the
units of evolution approach. There are several alternative formula-
tions (itself a nice area of study); here we opt for Maynard Smith’s
formulation that seems to us the most promising for our present
purposes. JMS (Maynard Smith, 1986) deﬁned a unit of evolution
as any entity that has the following properties. The ﬁrst property
is multiplication; the entity produces copies of itself that can make
further copies of themselves: one entity produces two, two entities
produce four, four entities produce eight, in a process known as
autocatalytic growth. Most living things are capable of autocat-
alytic growth, but there are some exceptions, for example, sterile
worker ants and mules do not multiply and so whilst being alive,
they are not units of evolution (Szathmary, 2000; Gánti, 2003; Sza-
thmáry, 2006). The second requirement is inheritance, i.e., there
must be multiple possible kinds of entity, each kind propagating
itself (like begets like). Some things are capable of autocatalytic
growth and yet do not have inheritance, for example ﬁre can grow
exponentially for it is the macroscopic phenomenon arising from
an autocatalytic reaction, yet ﬁre does not accumulate adapta-
tions by NS. The third requirement is that there must be variation
(more accurately: variability): i.e., heredity is not completely exact.
If among the hereditary properties we ﬁnd some that affect the
fecundity and/or survival of the units, then in a population of
such units of evolution, NS can take place. There is a loose algo-
rithmic prescription here because the deﬁnition explicitly refers to
operations, such asmultiplication, information transmission,vari-
ation, ﬁtness mapping, etc. We can conclude that neuronal groups
are not units of evolution in this sense. It then follows that the picture
portrayed by Edelman cannot be properly named neural Darwin-
ism! This being so despite the fact that it ﬁts Price’s view of general
selection, but not speciﬁcally Darwinian natural selection. We shall
see that this difference causes harsh algorithmic differences in the
efﬁciency of search processes.
Now that we see what is likely to have been behind the disagree-
ments, we would like to consider another aspect in this section: the
problemof transmission bias (property change). In biological evo-
lution this can be caused by, for example, environmental change,
mutation, or recombination (whenever heredity is not exact). And
this can create a problem. Adaptations arise when the covariance
term in Eq. 1 is signiﬁcant relative to the transmission bias. One
of Crick’s criticisms can again be interpreted in this framework:
“I do not consider that in selection the basic repertoire must be
completely unchanging, though Edelman’s account suggests that
he believes this is usually true at the synaptic level. I do feel that in
Edelman’s simulation of the somatosensory cortex (Neural Dar-
winism, p. 188 onward) the change between an initial confused
mass of connections and the ﬁnal state (showing somewhat dis-
tinct neuronal groups) is too extreme to be usefully described as
the selection of groups, though it does demonstrate the selection of
synapses”(Crick,1990,p. 13).He also proposes:“If some terminol-
ogy is needed in relation to the (hypothetical) neuronal groups,
why not simply talk about ‘group formation’?” (Crick, 1989, p.
247). First, we concede that indeed there is a problem here with
the relativeweight of the covariance and transmission bias in terms
of the Price formulation. There are two possible answers. One is
that as soon as the groups solidify, there is good selection sensu
Price in the population of groups. But the more exciting answer is
that such group formation is not unknown in evolutionary biol-
ogy either. One of us has spent by now decades analyzing what
is called the major transitions in evolution (Maynard Smith and
Szathmáry, 1995). One of the crucial features of major transi-
tions is the emergence of higher-level units from lower level ones,
or – to borrow Crick’s phrase – formation of higher units (such
as protocells from naked genes or eukaryotic cells from separate
microbial lineages). The exciting question is this one: could it be
that the formation of Edelman’s groups is somehow analogous to
a major transition in evolutionary biology? Surely, it cannot be
closely analogous because neuronal groups do not reproduce. But
if we take a Pricean view, the answer may turn out to be differ-
ent. We shall return to this question, we just wet the appetite of
the reader now by stating that in fact there is a Pricean approach
to major transitions! Indeed, the recent formation of a secondary
repertoire of neuronal groups arising from formation and selec-
tion of connectivity patterns between neuronal groups appears to
be an example of such a transition. However, we note that whether
we are referring to the primary repertoire of assemblies, or the
secondary repertoire of super assemblies (Perin et al., 2011), there
is no replication of these forms at either level in NGS.
A VIEW OF THE THEORY OF SYNAPTIC SELECTION
Although admittedly not in the focus of either Edelman or Crick,
it is worthwhile to have a look at synaptic changes to have a clearer
view on whether they are subject to selection or evolution, and in
what sense. As we have seen, there is a view that selectionism at the
level of the synapse is always trivial, but the different expositions
have important differences. In this section we brieﬂy look at some
of the important alternatives; there is an excellent survey of this
and related matters in Weiss (1994).
Changeux (1985), Changeux et al. (1973) in his TSS primarily
focuses on how the connectivity of the networks becomes estab-
lished during epigenesis within the constraints set by genetics,
based on functional criteria. There is structural transformation of
the networks during this maturation. There is a period of struc-
tural redundancy, where the number of connections and even
neurons is greater than in the mature system (Figure 2). Synapses
can exist in stable, labile, and degenerate form. Selective stabi-
lization of functional connections prunes the redundancy to a
considerable degree.
The question is again to what extent this is selection or a truly
Darwinian process. One can readily object that as it is portrayed
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GROWTH
TRANSIENT
REDUNDANCY
SELECTIVE 
STABILISATION
FIGURE 2 | Growth and stabilization of synapses, adapted from
Changeux (1985).
the process is a one-shot game. An extended period of redundancy
formation is followed by an extended period of functional prun-
ing. SinceDarwinian evolution unfolds throughmany generations
of populations of units, the original view offered by Changeux is
selectionist, but not Darwinian. Again, the whole picture can be
conveniently cast in terms of the Price formulation, however.
If it were not a one-shot game, and there were several rounds
of synapse formation and selective stabilization, one could legiti-
mately raise the issue of whether one is dealing with generations of
evolutionary units in some sense. But this is exactly the picture that
seems to be emerging under the modern view of structural plas-
ticity of the adult brain (Chklovskii et al., 2004; Butz et al., 2009;
Holtmaat and Sovoboda, 2009). We shall see in a later section that
this view has some algorithmic beneﬁts, but for the time being
we consider a formulation of synaptic Darwinism that is a more
rigorous attempt to build a mapping between some concepts of
neuroscience and evolutionary theory. Adams (1998) proposes
(consonant with several colleagues in this ﬁeld) that synaptic
strengthening (LTP) is analogous to replication, synaptic weak-
ening (LTD) is analogous to death (disappearance of the copy of
a gene), the input array to a neuron corresponds to the genotype,
the speciﬁcation of the output vector by the input vector is anal-
ogous to genotype–phenotype mapping, and a (modiﬁed) Hebb
rule corresponds to the survival of the ﬁttest (selection; Adams,
1998). There is some confusion, though, in an otherwise clear
picture, since Adams proposes that something like an organism
corresponds to the kind of bundling one obtains when “all neu-
rons within an array receive the same neuromodulatory signal”
(p. 434). Here one is uncertain whether the input vector as the
“neuronal genotype” is that of these bundled group of axons, or
whether he means the input vector of one neuron, or whether it is
a matter of context which understanding applies.
We elaborate a bit on the suggestion that Darwin and Hebb
shake hands in a modiﬁed Hebb rule. We have shown (Fernando
and Szathmáry, 2010) that the Oja rule (a modiﬁed Hebb rule)
is practically isomorphic to an Eigen equation describing repli-
cation, mutation, and selection a population of macromolecules.
The Eigen (1971) equation reads:
dxi
dt
= AiQixi +
N∑
j =i
mijxj − xi
c
N∑
j=1
N∑
k=1
mijxj , (2)
where xi is the concentration of sequence i (of RNA for exam-
ple), mij is the mutation rate from sequence j to i, Ai is the gross
replication rate of sequence i and Qi is its copying ﬁdelity, N is
the total number of different sequences, and formally mij =AiQi.
The negative term introduces the selection constraint which keeps
total concentration constant at the value of c (which canbe taken as
unity without loss of generality). The relation between theOja rule
and the Eigen equation is tricky. TheOja rule corresponds to a very
peculiar conﬁguration of parameters in the Eigen equation. For
example, in contrast to the molecular case, here the off-diagonal
elements (the mutation rates) are not by orders of magnitude
smaller than the diagonal ones (the ﬁtnesses). Moreover, muta-
tional coupling between two replicators is strictly the product of
the individual ﬁtness values! In short, Eigen’s equation can simu-
late Hebbian dynamics with the appropriate parameter values, but
the reverse is not generally true: Oja’s rule could not, for example,
simulate the classical molecular quasispecies of Eigen in general.
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This hints at the more general possibility that although formal
evolutionary dynamics could hold widely in brain dynamics, it
is severely constrained in parameter space so that the outcome
is behaviorally useful. A remarkable outcome of the cited deriva-
tion is that although there was no consideration of “mutation” in
the original setting, there are large effective mutation rates in the
corresponding Eigen equation: this coupling ensures correlation
detection between the units (synapses or molecules). (Coupling
must be represented somehow: in the Eigen equation the only way
to couple two different replicators is through mutation. Hence if
a molecular or biological population with such strange mutation
terms were to exist, it would detect correlation between individual
ﬁtnesses.)
The formalistic appearance of synaptic weight change to muta-
tion might with some justiﬁcation be regarded as gimmickry, i.e.,
merely anunhelpfulmetaphor for anything that happens to change
through time. Sowhat couldbe analogous in the case of synapses to
genetic mutations?We believe the obvious analog to genetic muta-
tion is structural synaptic change, i.e., the formation of topologies
that did not previously exist. Whereas the Eigen equation is a
description of molecular dynamics, it is a deterministic dynamical
system with continuous variables in which the full state space of
the system has been deﬁned at the onset, i.e., the vector of chemi-
cal concentrations. It is worth emphasizing that nothing replicates
when one numerically solves the Eigen equation. There are no real
units of evolution when one solves the Eigen equation, instead the
Eigen equation is a model of the concentration changes that could
be implemented by units of evolution. It is a model of processes
that occur when replicators exist. Real mutation allows the pro-
duction of entities that did not previously exist, i.e., it allows more
than mere subset selection. For example this is the case where the
state space being explored is so large that it can only be sparse sam-
pled, e.g., as in a 100 nucleotide sequence, and it is also the case
when new neuronal connectivity patterns are formed by structural
mutation.
In Hebbian dynamics there are also continuous variables, but
in the simplest case there is only growth and no replication of
individuals. As Adams put it, “the synaptic equivalent of repli-
cation is straightforward. . . It corresponds to strengthening. If a
synapse becomes biquantal, it has replicated” (Adams, 1998, p.
421). Yet this is different from replication in evolution where the
two copies normally separate from each other. This aspect will
turn out to be crucially important later when we consider search
mechanisms.
Adams draws pictures of real replication and mutation of
synapses (Figure 3) also. Clearly, these ﬁgures anticipate com-
ponent processes of the now fashionable structural plasticity
(Chklovskii et al., 2004). It is this picture that is closely analo-
gous to the dynamics of replicators in evolution. In principle this
allows for some very interesting, truly Darwinian dynamics.
The last item in this section is the concept of a “hedonistic
synapse” by Seung (2003). This hypothetical mechanism was con-
sidered in the context of reinforcement learning. The learning rule
is as follows: (1) the probability of release is increased if reward
follows release and is decreased if reward follows failure, (2) the
probability of release is decreased if punishment follows release
and is increased if punishment follows failure. Seung writes: “ran-
domness is harnessed by the brain for learning, in analogy to the
way geneticmutation is utilized byDarwinian evolution”(p. 1063)
and that“dynamics of learning executes a randomwalk in the para-
meter space, which is biased in a direction that increases reward.
A picturesque term for such behavior is “hill-climbing,” which
comes from visualizing the average reward as the height of a land-
scape over the parameter space. The formal term is “stochastic
gradient ascent”” (p. 1066). This passage is of crucial importance
for our discussion of search algorithms in this paper. The analogy
seems to be crystal-clear, especially since it can be used to recall the
notion of an “adaptive landscape” by Wright (1932), arguably the
most important metaphor in evolution (Maynard Smith, 1988).
We shall see later that Seung’s synapse may be hedonistic, but not
Darwinian.
SELECTION IN GROUPS OF NEURONS
We have already touched upon the functioning of the dynamics of
neuronal groups as portrayed by Edelman (1987). We shall come
back to one key element of NGS at the end of this section.
Now we turn to a complementary approach offered by
Changeux (1985), the Theory of Selective Stabilization of Pre-
representations (TSSP), which builds on TSS. TSSP elaborates on
the question how somatic selection contributes to the functioning
of the adult brain (Changeux et al., 1984; Heidmann et al., 1984),
i.e., after transient redundancy has been functionally pruned. The
ﬁrst postulate of TSSP is that there are mental object (represen-
tations) in the brain, which is a physical state produced by an
replication mutation (divergent) mutation (convergent)
FIGURE 3 | Synaptic mutation replication (left) and synaptic mutations (right), adapted fromAdams (1998).
Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org April 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 24 | 6
Fernando et al. Neural Darwinism debugged
assembly (group) of neurons. Pre-representations are generated
before and during interaction with the environment, and they
come in very large numbers due to the spontaneous but correlated
activity of neurons. Learning is the transformation, by selective
stabilization, of some labile pre-representations into stored repre-
sentations. Primary percepts must resonate (in space or time) with
pre-representations in order to become selected. To quite him:
“These pre-representations exist before the interaction with the
outside world. They arise from the recombination of pre-existing
sets of neurons or neuronal assemblies, and their diversity is thus
great.On theother hand, they are labile and transient.Only a fewof
them are stored. This storage results from a selection!” (Changeux,
1985, p. 139). No explanation is given of how a beneﬁcial prop-
erty of one group would be transmitted when it is “recombined”
with another group. The reticular formation is proposed to be
responsible for the selection, by re-entry of signals from cortex
to thalamus and back to cortex, which is a means of establishing
resonance between stored mental objects and percepts.
Changeux assumes the formation of pre-representations occurs
spontaneously from a large number of neurons such that the num-
ber of possible combinations is astronomical, and that this may
be sufﬁcient to explain the diversity of mental representations,
images, and concepts. But how can such a large space of represen-
tations be searched rapidly and efﬁciently? Changeux addresses
this by suggesting that heuristics act on the search through pre-
representations, notably, he allows recombination between neu-
ronal assemblies, writing “this recombining activity would repre-
sent a ‘generator of hypotheses,’ a mechanism of diversiﬁcation
essential for the geneses of pre-representations and subsequent
selection of new concepts.” (Changeux, 1985, p167). However, no
mechanism for recombination of functions is presented.
Changeux and Dehaene (1989) offer a uniﬁed account of TSS
and TSSP and their possible contributions to cognitive func-
tions. “The interaction with the outside world would not enrich
the landscape, but rather would select pre-existing energy min-
ima or pre-representations and enlarge them at the expense of
other valleys.” (p. 89). In an elegant model of temporal sequence
learning, Dehaene et al. (1987) show that “In the absence of sen-
sory inputs, starting from any initial condition, sequences are
spontaneously produced. Initially these pre-representations are
quasirandom, although they partially reveal internal connectivity,
but very small sensory weights (inferior to noise level) sufﬁce to
inﬂuence these productions.” (p. 2731). “The learnable sequences
must thus belong both to the pre-representations and to the sen-
sory percepts received” (pp. 2730–2731). Noise plays a role in the
dynamics of the system.
Later models incorporate stabilization of the conﬁgurations
in a global workspace by internal reward and attention signals
(Dehaene et al., 1998). In a model of the Stroop task, a global
workspace is envisaged as having a repertoire of discrete activation
patterns, only one of which can be active at once, and which
can persist independent of inputs with some stability. This is
meant to model persistent activity of neurons in prefrontal cortex.
These patterns constitute the selected entity (pre-representation),
which “if negatively evaluated, or if attention fails, may be sponta-
neously and randomly replaced.” Reward allows restructuring of
the weights in the workspace. The improvement in performance
depends on the global workspace having sufﬁcient variation in
patterns at the onset of the effortful task, perhaps with additional
random variability, e.g., Dehaene and Changeux (1997) write that
“in the absence of speciﬁc inputs, prefrontal clusters activate with
a fringe of variability, implementing a ‘generator of diversity’.”
The underlying search algorithm is nothing more sophisticated
than a random walk through pre-representation space, biased by
reward! It truly stretches one’s imagination how such a process
could be sufﬁcient for language learning, for example, which is
much more complex than the Stoop task but not effortful in the
sense of Changeux and Dehaene.
A ﬁnal note on a common element of the similar theories of
Changeux and Edelman is in order. Sporns and Edelman (1993)
present a tentative solution the Bernstein problem in the devel-
opment of motor control. Besides the already discussed selective
component processes of NGS, they state: “The ‘motor cortex’
generates patterns of activity corresponding to primary gestural
motions through a combination of spontaneous activity (triggered
by a component of Gaussian noise) and by responses to sensory
inputs from vision and kinesthetic signals from the arm.” Thus
noise is again a source of the requisite variety (p. 971).
So, again, “how much” Darwinism is there in these theories?
Changeux andDehaene (1989) insist:“the thesis wewish to defend
in the following is the opposite; namely, that the production and
storage of mental representations, including their chaining into
meaningful propositions and the development of reasoning, can
also be interpreted, by analogy, in variation–selection (Darwin-
ian) terms within psychological time-scales.” We actually agree
with that, but the trouble is that algorithmically the search mecha-
nisms they present are very different from that of any evolutionary
algorithm proper, and seem to correspond to stochastic gradient
ascent, as explained by Seung (2003) for his hedonistic synapses,
even if there is a population of stochastic hill-climbers. Something
is crucially missing!
COMBINATORIAL CHEMISTRY VERSUS IN VITRO SELECTION
OF FUNCTIONAL MACROMOLECULES
The reader might think that this is a digression. Not so, there
are some crucial lessons to be learnt from this example. The pro-
duction of functional molecules is critical for life and also for an
increasing proportion of industry. It is also important that genes
representwhat in cognitive science has been called a“physical sym-
bol system” (Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1988; Nilsson, 2007; Fernando,
2011a). Today, the genetic code is an arguably symbolic mapping
between nucleotide triplets and amino acids (see Maynard Smith,
2000 for a characteristically lucid account of the concept of infor-
mation in biology; Maynard Smith, 2000). Moreover, enzymes
“know” how to transform a substrate into a product, much like
a linguistic rule “knows” how to act on some linguistic construc-
tions to produce others. How can such functionality arise? We
must understand both, how the combinatorial explosion of pos-
sibilities (sequences) is generated, and how selection for adaptive
sequences is implemented.
Combinatorial chemistry is one of the possible approaches. The
aim is to generate-and-test a complete library of molecules up to
a certain length. The different molecules must be tested for func-
tionality, be identiﬁed as distinct sequences, and then ampliﬁed for
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lab or commercial production. It is easy to see that this approach is
limited by combinatorial explosion.Whereas complete libraries of
oligopeptides can be produced, this is impossible for polypeptides
(proteins). The snag is that enzymes tend to be polymers. For pro-
teins, there are 20100 possible polypeptide sequences of length 100,
which equal 10130, a hyper-astronomically large number. In any
realistic system an extremely tiny fraction of these molecules can
be synthesized. The discrete space of possible sequences is heavily
under-occupied, or – to use a phrase that should ring a bell for
neuroscientists – sparsely populated. In order to look for func-
tional sequences one needs an effective search mechanism. That
search mechanism is in vitro genetics and selection. Ultimately, it
is applied replicator dynamics. This technology yielded spectacu-
lar results. We just mention the case of ribozymes, catalytic RNA
molecules that are very rare in contemporary biochemistry but
may have been dominating in the “RNA world” before the advent
of the genetic code (c.f. Maynard Smith and Szathmáry, 1995). An
impressive list of such ribozymes has been generated by in vitro
evolution (Ellington et al., 2009).
Of course, the mapping of RNA sequence to a functional
3D molecule is highly degenerate, meaning that many different
sequences canperform the same function. Butwhat does thismean
in terms of the probability of ﬁnding a given function in a library
of randomRNAmolecules? The number of random sequences in a
compositionally unbiased pool of RNAmolecules, 100 nucleotides
long, required for a 50% probability of ﬁnding at least one func-
tional molecule is, in the case of the isoleucine aptamer on the
order 109, and in case of the hammerhead ribozyme on the order
of 1010 (Knight et al., 2005). This is now regarded as an inﬂated
estimate, due to the existence of essential but not conserved parts
(Majerfeld et al., 2010); thus the required numbers are at least an
order of magnitude larger. Note that these are simple function-
alities: the ﬁrst case is just binding rather than catalysis, and the
second case is an “easy” reaction to catalyze for RNA molecules.
Simulation studies demonstrate that when mutation and selection
are combined, a very efﬁcient search for molecular functionality
is possible: typically, 10,000 RNA molecules going through about
a 100 generations of mutation and selection are sufﬁcient to ﬁnd,
and often ﬁx, the target (Stich and Manrubia, 2011).
The reason for us presenting the molecular selection/evolution
case is as follows. Given the unlimited information potential of
the secondary repertoire, conﬁgurations from which can only be
sparsely sampled as in RNA sequence space, the advantages of Dar-
winian search are likely to also apply. Molecular technologies show
that parallel search for molecular functionalities is efﬁcient with
replication with mutation and selection if the search space is vast,
and occupation of sequence space is sparse. We shall return to the
algorithmic advantages of this paradigm later.
SYNAPSES, GROUPS, AND MULTILEVEL SELECTION
We have already raised the issue whether the developmental origin
and consolidation of neuronal groups might be analogous in some
sense to the major transitions in evolution. Based on the forego-
ing analysis this cannot apply in the Darwinian sense since while
synapses can grow and reproduce in the sense of Adams (1998),
neuronal groups do not reproduce. Yet, the problem is more tricky
than this, because – as we have seen – selection does apply to
neuronal groups in terms of the Price equation, and the Price
equation has been used to describe aspects of multilevel selection
(Heisler and Damuth, 1987; Damuth and Heisler, 1988), includ-
ing those of the major transitions in evolution (Okasha, 2006).
In concrete terms, if one deﬁnes a Price equation at the level
of the groups, the effect of intra-group selection can be substi-
tuted for the transmission bias (see Marshall, 2011 for a technical
overview), which makes sense because selection within groups
effectively means group identity can be changed due to internal
dynamics.
As Damuth and Heisler (1988) write: “A multilevel selection
situation is one in which we wish to consider simultaneously selec-
tion occurring among entities at two or more different levels in a
nested biological hierarchy (such as organisms within groups)”
(p. 408). “There are two perspectives in this two-level situation
from which we may ask questions about selection. First, we may
be interested in the relative ﬁtnesses of the individuals and in
how their group membership may affect these ﬁtnesses and thus
the evolution of individual characters in the whole population of
individuals. Second, we may be interested in the changing pro-
portions of different types of groups as a result of their different
propensities to go extinct or to found new groups (i.e., the result of
different group ﬁtnesses); of interest is the evolution of group char-
acters in the population of groups. In this case, we have identiﬁed
a different kind of ﬁtness than in the ﬁrst, a group-level ﬁtness that
is not simply the mean of the ﬁtnesses of the group’s members. Of
course, individual ﬁtnesses and group ﬁtnesses may be correlated
in some way, depending on the biology. But in the second case we
are asking a fundamentally different question that requires a focus
on different properties – a question explicitly about differential
success of groups rather than individuals” (p. 409). It is now cus-
tomary to call these two perspectives multilevel selection I (MLS1)
and multilevel selection II (MLS2) in the biological literature. In
the view of Okasha (2006) major transitions can be mirrored by
the degree to which these two perspectives apply: in the beginning
there is MLS1, and in the end there is MLS2. In between he pro-
poses to have intermediates stages where “collective ﬁtness is not
deﬁned as average particle ﬁtness but is proportional to average
particle ﬁtness” (p. 238).
It is tempting to apply this picture to the synapses → neu-
ronal group transition, but one should appreciate subtle, tacit
assumptions of the evolutionary models. Typically it is assumed
that in MLS1 the groups are transient, that there is no popula-
tion structure within groups, and that each generation of new
groups is formed according to some probabilistic distribution.
However, in the brain the process does not begin with synapses
reproducing before the group is formed, since the topology and
strength of synaptic connections deﬁnes the group. Synapses, even
if labile, are existing connections not only topologically, but also
topographically.
In sum, one can formally state that there is a major transition
when neuronal groups emerge and consolidate in brain dynamics,
and that there are two levels of selection, but only if one adopts a
generalized (as opposed to strictly Darwinian) Pricean view of the
selection, since neither neurons nor neuronal groups replicate. It
is also worth saying that a formal analysis of synapses and groups
in terms the Price equation, based on dynamical simulations of the
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(emerging) networks has never been performed. We might learn
something by such an exercise.
DARWINIAN AND BAYESIAN DYNAMICS
Many have drawn analogies between learning and evolution.
Bayesian inference has proven a very successful model to char-
acterize aspects of brain function at the computational level, as
have Darwinian dynamics accounts for evolution of organisms at
the algorithmic level. It is natural to seek a relationship between the
two. A few people (Zhang, 1999; Harper, 2009; Shalizi, 2009) have
realized the connection in formal terms. Here we follow Harper’s
(2009) brief and lucid account. Let H 1, H 2 . . ., Hn be a collection
of hypotheses; then according to Bayes’ theorem:
P (Hi |E) = P (E |Hi) P (Hi)
P (E)
for i = 1, 2, . . . n, (3)
where the process iteratively adjusts the probability of the hypothe-
ses in line with the evidence from each new observation E. There
is a prior distribution [P(H 1), . . ., P(Hn)], the probability of
the event given a hypothesis is given by P(E |Hi), P(E) serves
as normalization, and the posterior distribution is [P(H 1|E),
. . ., P(Hn|E)]. Compare this with the discrete-time replicator
equation:
x ′i =
xi fi (x)
f (x)
, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, (4)
where xi is the relative frequency of type in the population, prime
means next generation, and fi is its per capita ﬁtness that in gen-
eral may depend on the population state vector x. (Note that
this is a difference to Eq. 3 where the probability of a hypothesis
does not depend on any other hypothesis). It is fairly straight-
forward to appreciate the isomorphism between the two models.
Both describe at a purely computational (not algorithmic) level
what happens during Bayesian reasoning and NS, and both equa-
tions have the same form. The following correspondences apply:
prior distribution ←→ population state now, new evidence ←→
ﬁtness landscape, normalization ←→ mean ﬁtness, posterior
distribution ←→ population state in the next generation. This
isomorphism is not vacuously formalistic. There is a continuous-
time analog of the replicator Eq. 4, of which the Eigen Eq. 2 is
a concrete case. It can be shown that the Kullback–Leibler infor-
mation divergence between the current population vector and the
vector corresponding to the evolutionarily stable state (ESS) is a
local Lyapunov function of the continuous-time replicator equa-
tion; thepotential informationplays a similar role for discrete-time
dynamics in that the difference in potential information between
two successive states decreases in the neighborhood of the ESS
along iteration of the dynamic. Moreover, the solutions of the
replicator Eq. 4 can be expressed in terms of exponential families
(Harper, 2009), which is important because exponential families
play an analogous role in the computational approach to Bayesian
inference.
Recalling that we said that Darwinian NS that takes place when
there are units of evolution is an algorithm that can do computa-
tions described by the Eigen equation, one feels stimulated to raise
the idea: if the brain is computationally a Bayesian device, than
it might be doing Bayesian computation by using a Darwinian
algorithm (a“Darwin machine”; Calvin, 1987) containing units of
evolution. Given that it is also having to search in a high dimen-
sional space, perhaps the same beneﬁts of a Darwinian algorithm
will accrue? The isomorphisms do not give direct proof of this,
because of the following reason. Whereas Eq. 3 is a Bayesian cal-
culation, Eq. 4 is not an evolutionary calculation, it is a model of a
population doing, potentially, an evolutionary calculation.
Our recently proposed neuronal replicator hypothesis (NRH)
states that there are units of evolution in the brain (Fernando et al.,
2008, 2010). If the NRH holds any water, the brain must harbor
real replicators, not variables for the frequencies of replicators. In
other words, there must be information transfer between units
of evolution. This is crucially lacking in Edelman’s proposal of
Neural Darwinism. It is molecules and organisms that can evolve,
not population counts thereof. Of course, based on the foregoing
it must be true that replicating populations can perform Bayesian
calculations with appropriate parameters and ﬁtness landscapes.
Is any advantage gained from this insight? The answer seems to
be yes. Kwok et al. (2005) show the advantages of an evolutionary
particle ﬁlter algorithm to alleviate the sample impoverishment
problem; Muruzábal and Cotta (2007) present an evolutionary
programming solution to the search for Bayesian network graph
structures;Myers et al. (1999) report a similar study (see Figure 4);
Strens (2003) shows the usefulness of evolutionary Markov-Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling and optimization; and Huda
et al. (2009) report on a constraint-based evolutionary algorithm
approach to expectation minimization that does not get trapped
so often in local optima. Thus it seems that not only can evolu-
tionary algorithms do Bayesian inference, for complex problems
they are likely to be better at it. In fact, Darwinian algorithms
have yet to be fully investigated within the new ﬁeld of rational
process models that study how optimal Bayesian calculations can
be algorithmically approximated in practice (Sanborn et al., 2010).
A burning question is how Bayesian calculations can be per-
formed in the brain. George and Hawkins (2009) present a fairly
detailed, but tentative account in terms of cortical microcircuits.
Recent work by Nessler et al. (2009) shows that Bayesian compu-
tations can be implemented in spiking neural networks with ﬁrst
order spike-time-dependent plasticity (STDP). Another possibil-
ity is the implementation of Deep Belief Networks which carry out
approximate hierarchical Bayesian inference (Hinton et al., 2006).
The research program for NRH is to do the same for evolutionary
computation, and to determine whether Bayesian inference may
be carried out in a related way.
DARWINIAN DYNAMICS AND OPTIMIZATION
One could object to using NS in the neurobiological context that
it is an imperfect search algorithm since there is no guarantee that
the optimal solution can be found; the population might get stuck
on a local instead of a global peak. This is true but by itself irrel-
evant. No search algorithm is perfect in this sense. The question
is whether we on average gain something important in compari-
son with other search algorithms. “It is true that the optimization
approach starts from the idea, already familiar to Darwin,Wallace,
and Weismann. . . that adaptation is a pervasive feature of living
organisms, and that it is to be explained by NS. It is not our aim
to add to this claim that adaptation is perfect. Rather, the aim is
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FIGURE 4 | Crossover operation for Bayesian networks. Adapted from Myers et al. (1999).
to understand speciﬁc examples of adaptation, in terms of selective
forces and the historical and developmental constraints operat-
ing. This requires that we have an explicit model, in each speciﬁc
case, that tells us what to expect from a given assumption. . . We
distinguish between general models and speciﬁc models, though
in reality they form part of a continuum. General models have
a heuristic function; they give qualitative insights into the range
and forms of solution for some common biological problem. The
parameters used may be difﬁcult to measure biologically, because
the main aim is to make the analysis and conclusions as simple
and direct as possible” (Parker and Maynard Smith, 1990, p. 27).
Evolution by NS is an optimum-seeking process, but this does
not guarantee that it will always ﬁnd it. There are constraints on
adaptation (which can be genetic, developmental, etc.) but the
living world is full of spectacular adaptations nevertheless. And
in many cases the solution is at, or very close to, the engineer-
ing optimum. For example, many enzymes are optimally adapted
in the sense that the rate of catalysis is now constrained by the
diffusion rates of substrates and products, so in practical terms
those enzymes cannot be faster than they are. It is the same for
senses (photon detection by the eye), or the boosted efﬁciency of
photosynthesis by quantum entanglement. True, performance just
has to be “good enough,” but good enough means relative to the
distribution in the population, but as selection acts, the average
is increasing, so the level of “good enough” is raising as well, as
standard population genetics demonstrates (e.g., Maynard Smith,
1998). It is in this sense that we believe the applicability of evo-
lutionary models of brain function warrant serious scrutiny, even
if for the time being their exploration is at the rather “general”
level.
A non-trivial aspect of neuronal groups is degeneracy (Edel-
man, 1987): structurally different networks can do the same
calculations. Usually degeneracy is not a feature of minimalist
models but it is certainly important for dynamics. Changeux and
Dehaene (1989) called attention to this in their landmark paper:
“In the course of the proposed epigenesis, diversiﬁcation of neu-
rons belonging to the same category occurs. Each one acquires its
individuality or singularity by the precise pattern of connections
it establishes (and neurotransmitters it synthesizes). . . A major
consequence of the theory is that the distribution of these sin-
gular qualities may also vary signiﬁcantly from one individual to
the next. Moreover, it can be mathematically demonstrated that
the same afferent message may stabilize different connective orga-
nizations, which nevertheless results in the same input–output
relationships. . . The variability referred to in the theory, therefore
may account for the phenotypic variance observed between dif-
ferent isogenic individuals. At the same time, however, it offers
a neural implementation for the often-mentioned paradox that
there exists a non-unique mapping of a given function to the
underlying neural organization.” (Changeux and Dehaene, 1989,
p. 81).
The important point for NRH is that degeneracy plays a crucial
role in the evolvability of replicators (Toussaint, 2003; Wagner,
2007; Parter et al., 2008). Evolvability has several different def-
initions; for our purposes here the most applicable approach is
the measure of how fast a population can respond to directional
selection. It is known that genetic recombination is a key evolv-
ability component in this regard (Maynard Smith, 1998). It has
been found that neutral networks also play a role in evolvabil-
ity. Neutral networks are a web of connections in genotype space
among degenerate replicators having the same ﬁtness in a partic-
ular context. By deﬁnition two replicators at different nodes of
such a network are selectively neutral, but their evolvability may
be very different: one may be far, but the other may be close to a
“promising” region of the ﬁtness landscape; their offspring might
then have very different ﬁtnesses. Parter et al. (2008) show that
under certain conditions variation becomes facilitated : random
genetic changes canbeunexpectedlymore frequent indirections of
phenotypic usefulness. This occurs when different environments
present selective goals composed of the same subgoals, but in dif-
ferent combinations. Evolving replicator populations can “learn”
about the deep structure of the landscape so that their varia-
tion ceases to be entirely “random” in the classical neo-Darwinian
sense. This occurs if there is non-trivial neutrality as described by
Toussaint (2003) and demonstrated for gene regulatory networks
(Izquierdo and Fernando, 2008). We propose that this feature will
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turn out to be critical for neuronal replicators if they exist. This
is closely related to how hierarchical Bayesian models ﬁnd deep
structure in data (Kemp and Tenenbaum, 2008; Tenenbaum et al.,
2011).
Finally, an important aspect is the effect of population structure
on the dynamics of evolution (c.f. Maynard Smith and Szathmáry,
1995; Szathmáry, 2011). Previously we (Fernando and Szathmáry,
2009) have noted that neuronal evolutionary dynamics could turn
out to be the best ﬁeld of application of evolutionary graph theory
(Lieberman et al., 2005). It has been shown that some topologies
speed up,whereas others retard adaptive evolution.Figure 5 shows
an example of favorable topologies (selection ampliﬁers). The
brain could well inﬂuence the replacement topologies by gating,
thereby realizing the most rewarding topologies.
REINFORCEMENT LEARNING
Thorndike (1911) formulated the “law of effect” stating that bene-
ﬁcial outcomes increase andnegative outcomesdecrease the occur-
rence of a particular type of behavior. It has been noted (Maynard
Smith, 1986) that there is a similarity between the dynamics of
genetic selection and the operant conditioning paradigm of Skin-
ner (1976). Börgers and Sarin (1997) pioneered a formal link
between replicator dynamics and reinforcement learning. It could
be shown that in the continuous-time limit the dynamics can
be approximated by a deterministic replicator equation, formally
describing the dynamics of a reinforcement learner.
The most exciting latest development is due to Loewenstein
(2011) who shows that if reinforcement follows a synaptic rule
FIGURE 5 | A selection amplifier topology from Lieberman et al. (2005).
Vertices that change often, due to replacement from the neighbors, are
colored in orange. In the present context each vertex can be a neuron or
neuronal group that can inherit its state from its upstream neighbors and
pass on its state to the downstream neighbors. Neuronal evolution would
be evolution on graphs.
that establishes a covariance between reward and neural activity,
the dynamics follows a replicator equation, irrespective of the ﬁne
details of the model. Let pi(t ) be the probability of choosing alter-
native i at time t. A simple expression of the dynamics of the
probabilities postulates:
dpi
dt
= ηpi (E [R|A = i] − E [R]) , (5)
where η is the learning rate A denotes the action, R is reward, and
E[R] is the average return; and the form is that of a continuous-
time replicator equation. Probabilities depend on the synaptic
weight vector W(t ), i.e.,
pi (t ) = pi (W (t )) . (6)
The learning rule in discrete-time is:
Δpi (t + 1) = pi (W (t + 1)) − pi (W (t )) , (7)
and the change in synaptic strength in a trial is:
ΔW = ϕR (N − E [N ]) (8)
where ϕ is the plasticity rate and N is any measure of neural activ-
ity. The expectation value for this change can be shown to obey:
E [ΔW] = ϕCov [R,N ] , (9)
which is the covariance rule (the form of the synaptic weight
change in Eq. 8 can take different forms, while the covariance
rule still holds). Using the average velocity approximation the
stochastic dynamics can be replaced by a deterministic one:
dW
dt
= ϕCov [R,N ] .
Now we can differentiate Eq. 6 with respect to time, and after
several operations we obtain exactly Eq. 5, with a calculable learn-
ing rate! This is by deﬁnition a selectionist view in terms of Price,
and arguably there are units of selection at the synapse level, but no
units of evolution, since “mutation” in a sense of an evolutionary
algorithm does not play a role in this elegant formulation. There
is selection from a given stock, exactly as in many other models we
have seen so far, but there is no generation and testing of novelty.
NGS does provide a mechanism for the generation and testing of
novelty, i.e., the formation of the secondary repertoire and stochas-
tic search at the level of one neuronal group itself. Such dynamics
can be seen during the formation and destruction of polychronous
groups (Izhikevich, 2006; Izhikevich andHoppensteadt, 2009) and
can be modulated by dopamine based value systems (Izhikevich,
2007).
A relevant comparison is that of evolutionary computa-
tion with temporal-difference based reinforcement learning algo-
rithms. Neural Darwinism has been formulated as a neuronal
implementation of temporal-difference reinforcement learning
based on neuromodulation of STDP by dopamine reward
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(Izhikevich, 2007). Neuronal groups are considered to be poly-
chronous groups, where re-entry is merely recurrence in a recur-
rent neural network from which such groups emerge (Izhikevich
et al., 2004). An elaboration of Izhikevich’s paper by Chorley
and Seth considers extra re-entrant connections between basal
ganglia and cortex, showing that further TD-characteristics of
the dopaminergic signals in real brains can be captured with
this model.
We have made the comparison between temporal-difference
learning and evolutionary computation extensively elsewhere
(Fernando et al., 2008, 2010; Fernando and Szathmáry, 2009, 2010)
and we ﬁnd that there are often advantages in adding units of evo-
lution to temporal-difference learning systems in termsof allowing
improved function approximation and search in the space of pos-
sible representations of a state–action function (Fernando et al.,
2010). We would also expect that adding units of evolution to
neuronal models of TD-learning should improve the adaptive
potential of such systems.
COMPARING HILL-CLIMBING AND EVOLUTIONARY SEARCH
We have argued informally above that in some cases Darwinian
NS is superior compared to other stochastic search algorithms that
satisfy the Price equation but do not contain units of evolution.
Examples of search algorithms are reviewed in the table below.
The left hand column of Table 1 shows the simplest class of
search algorithm, solitary search. In solitary search at most two
candidate units are maintained at one time. Hill-climbing is an
example of a solitary search algorithm in which a variant of the
unit (candidate solution) is produced and tested at each “genera-
tion.” If the offspring solution’s quality exceeds that of its parent,
then the offspring replaces the parent. If it does not, then the off-
spring is destroyed and the parent produces another correlated
offspring. Such an algorithm can get stuck on local optima and
does not require replicators for its implementation. For example,
it can be implemented by a robot on a mountainous landscape for
example. A robot behaving according to stochastic hill-climbing
does the same, except that it stays in the newpositionwith a certain
probability even if it is slightly lower than the previous position.
By this method stochastic hill-climbing can sometimes avoid get-
ting stuck on local optima, but it can also occasionally lose the
peak. Simulated annealing is a variant of stochastic hill-climbing
in which the probability of accepting a worse solution is reduced
over time. Solitary stochastic search has been used by evolutionary
biologists such as Fisher to model idealized populations, i.e., where
only one mutant exists at any one time in the population (Fisher,
1930). However, a real Darwinian population is a much more
complex entity, and cannot be completely modeled by stochastic
hill-climbing.Herewe shouldmentionVanBelle’s (1997) criticism
of Neural Darwinism which makes a subtle point about stochastic
search. He points out that replication (units of evolution) permits
unmutated parental solutions to persist whilst mutated offspring
solutions are generated and tested. If the variant is maladapted,
the original is not lost. He claims that such replicators are missing
in Neural Darwinism. He demonstrates through a variant of Edel-
man’s Darwin I simulation that if neuronal groups change without
the capacity to revert to their previous form that they cannot even
be properly described as undertaking hill-climbing because they
cannot revert to the state they were in before taking the unsuccess-
ful exploration step. However, Boltzmann networks (Duda et al.,
2001) and other stochastic search processes such as Izhikevich’s
(2007) dopamine stabilized reinforcement learning networks and
Seung’s (2003) stochastic synapses show that even without explicit
memory of previous conﬁgurations that optimization is possible.
Therefore Van Belle has gone too far in saying that “The individu-
als of neural Darwinism do not replicate, thus robbing the process
of the capacity to explore new solutions over time and ultimately
reducing it to random search” because even without replicators,
adaptation by stochastic search is clearly possible.
Now consider column two of Table 1. What happens if more
robots are available on the hillside for ﬁnding the global optimum,
or more neuronal groups or synapses are available to explore the
space of neural representations? What is an efﬁcient way to use
these resources? The simplest algorithm for these robots to fol-
low would be that each one behaves completely independently of
the others and does not communicate with the others at all. Each
of them behave exactly like the solitary robot obeying whichever
solitary strategy (hill-climbing, stochastic hill-climbing, etc.) itwas
using before. This is achieved by simply having multiple instances
of the (stochastic) hill-climbing machinery. Multiple-restart hill-
climbing is a serial implementation of this same process. It may be
clear to the reader that such an algorithm is likely to be wasteful.
If a robot becomes stuck on a local optimum then there would be
no way of reusing this robot. Its resources are wasted. One could
expect only a linear speed up in the time taken to ﬁnd a global
optimum (the highest peak). It is not surprising that no popular
algorithm falls into this wasteful class.
Consider now the third column of Table 1. To continue the
robot analogy of search on a ﬁtness landscape, we not only have
Table 1 | A classification of search (generate-and-test) algorithms of the Pricean and true Darwinian types.
Solitary search Parallel search Parallel search with competition (price) Parallel searchwith competition and information
transmission (JMS)
Stochastic hill-climbing
(Prügel-Bennett, 2004)
Independent
hill-climbers
Competitive learning (Song et al., 2000) Genetic natural selection (Fisher, 1930)
Simulated annealing
(Duda et al., 2001)
Reinforcement learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998) Adaptive immune system (Flajnik and Kasahara, 2010)
Boltzmann learning
(Duda et al., 2001)
Synaptic selectionism (Changeux, 1985) Genetic algorithms (Holland, 1975)
Neural Darwinism (Edelmanism; Edelman, 1987) Didactic receptive ﬁelds (Young et al., 2007)
Neuronal Replicators (Fernando et al., 2008)
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multiple robots available, but there is competition between robots
for search resources (the machinery required to do a generate-
and-test step of producing a variant and assessing its quality).
In the case of robots a step is moving a robot to a new posi-
tion and reading the altitude there. Such an assessment step is
often the bottleneck in time and processing cost in a real opti-
mization process. If such steps were biased so that the currently
higher quality solutions did proportionally more of the search,
then there would be a biased search dominated by higher quality
solutions doing most of the exploration. This is known as com-
petitive learning because candidate solutions compete with each
other for reward and exploration opportunities. This is an exam-
ple of parallel search with resource competition, shown in column
3 of Table 1. It requires no NS as deﬁned by JMS, i.e., it requires no
explicit multiplication of information. No robot communicates its
position to other robots. Several algorithms fall into the above cat-
egory. Reinforcement learning algorithms are examples of parallel
search with competition (Sutton and Barto, 1998), see the dis-
cussion above about the Pricean interpretation of reinforcement
learning. Changeux’s synaptic selectionism also falls into this class
(Changeux et al., 1973; Changeux, 1985).
Do such systems of parallel search with competition between
synaptic slots exhibit NS? Not according to the deﬁnition of JMS
because there is no replicator; there is no copying of solutions
from one robot to another robot, there is no information that is
transmitted between synapses. Resources are simply redistributed
between synapses (i.e., synapses are strengthened or weakened in
the same way that the stationary robots increase or decrease their
exploitation of their current location). Notice, there is no trans-
mission of information between robots (e.g., by recruitment) in
this kind of search. Similarly there is no information transfer
between synapses in synaptic selectionism. Synaptic selection-
ism is selection in the Price sense, but not in the JMS sense.
Edelman’s TNGS falls into this category also. In a recent for-
mulation of Edelman’s theory of NGS, Izhikevich et al. (2004)
shows that there is no mechanism by which functional variations
in synaptic connectivity patterns can be inherited (transmitted)
between neuronal groups. Neural Darwinism is a class of paral-
lel search with competition but no information transfer between
solutions, and is thus fundamentally different from Darwinian NS
as deﬁned by JMS.
This leads us to the ﬁnal column in Table 1. Here is a radically
different way of utilizing multiple slots that extends the algorith-
mic capacity of the competitive learning algorithms above. In this
case we allow not only the competition of slots for generate-and-
test cycles, but we allow slots to pass information (traits/responses)
between each other. Returning to the robot analogy, those robots
at the higher altitudes can recruit robots from lower altitudes to
come and join them. This is equivalent to replication of robot loca-
tions. The currently best location can be copied to other slots.
There is transmission of information between slots. Note, repli-
cation is always of information (patterns), i.e., reconﬁguration by
matter of other matter. This means that the currently higher qual-
ity slots have not only a greater chance of being varied and tested,
but that they can copy their traits to other slots that do not have
such good quality traits. This permits the redistribution of infor-
mation between material slots. Crucially, such a system of parallel
search, competition, and information transmission between slots
does satisfy JMS’ deﬁnition of NS. The conﬁguration of a unit of
evolution (slot) can reconﬁgure other material slots. According to
this deﬁnition, several other algorithms fall into the same class as
NS, e.g., particle swarm optimization (Poli et al., 2007) because
they contain replicators.
ALGORITHMIC ADVANTAGES OF UNITS OF EVOLUTION
Are there algorithmic advantages of the full JMS-type NS com-
pared to independent stochastic hill-climbers or competitive sto-
chastic hill-climbers without information transmission that satis-
ﬁes only Price’s formulation of NS? We can ask: for what kinds of
search problem is a population of replicators undergoing NS with
mutation (but no crossover) superior to a population of inde-
pendent hill-climbers or stochastic hill-climbers competing for
resources?
Note, we are not claiming that Edelman’s Neural Darwinism is
exactly equivalent to competitive learning or to independent sto-
chastic hill-climbing It cannot be because Hebbian learning and
STDP impose many instructed transmission biases that are under-
determined by the transmission bias term in the Price equation at
the level of the neuronal group (and in fact, Hebb, and STDP have
been interpreted above as Pricean evolution at the synaptic level
thus). The claim is that it does not fall into the far right column of
Table 1, but is of the same class as competitive learning algorithms
that lack replicators.
So to answer ﬁrst the question of when JMS-type NS is supe-
rior to independent stochastic hill-climbing, a shock to the genetic
algorithm community came when it was shown that a hill-climber
actually outperforms a genetic algorithm on the Royal Road Func-
tion (Mitchell et al., 1994). This was in apparent contradiction to
the building-block hypothesis which had purported to explain
how genetic algorithms worked (Holland, 1975). But later it was
shown that a genetic algorithm (even without crossover) could
outperform a hill-climber in a problem which contained a local
optimum (Jansen et al., 2001). This was thought to be due to the
ability for a population to act almost like an ameba at a local
optimum, reaching down into a valley and searching the local
solutions more effectively. The most recent explanation for the
adaptive power of a Darwinian population is that the popula-
tion is an ideal data structure for representing a Bayesian prior
distribution of beliefs about the ﬁtness landscape (Zhang, 1999).
Another possible explanation is that replication allows multiple
search points to be recruited to the region of the search space that
is currently the best. The entire population (of robots) can acquire
the response characteristics (locations) of the currently best unit
(robot). Once all the robots have reached the currently best peak,
they can all do further exploration to ﬁnd even higher peaks. In
many real-world problems there is never a global optimum; rather
further mountain ranges remain to be explored after a plateau
has been reached. For example, there is no end to science. Not
every system that satisﬁes Price’s deﬁnition of selection can have
these special properties of being able to redistribute a variant to all
search points, i.e., for a solution to reach ﬁxation in a population.
Here we carefully compare the simplest NS algorithm with
independent hill-climbers on a real-world problem. Whilst we
do not claim to be able to fully explain why NS works better
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than a population of independent hill-climbers balanced for the
number of solution evaluations (no-one has yet fully explained
this) we show that in a representative real-world problem, it does
signiﬁcantly outperform the independent hill-climbers.
Intuition and empirical evidence (Mitchell et al., 1994; McIl-
hagga et al., 1996a,b; Keane and Nair, 2005; De Jong, 2006;
Harman and McMinn, 2007), suggest that selectionist, popula-
tion based search (even without crossover) will often outperform
hill-climbing in multimodal spaces (those with multiple peaks
and local optima). However, in relatively well-behaved search
spaces, for example with many smooth peaks which are easily
accessible from most parts of the space, a random multi-start hill-
climber may well give comparable or better performance (Mitchell
et al., 1994; Harman and McMinn, 2007). But as the complex-
ity of the space increases, the advantages of evolutionary search
should become more apparent. We explored this hypothesis by
comparing mutation-only genetic algorithms with a number of
hill-climbing algorithms on a non-trivial evolutionary robotics
(ER) problem. The particular ER task has been chosen because it
provides a challenging high dimensional search space with the fol-
lowing properties: noisy ﬁtness evaluations, a highly neutral space
with very few widely separated regions of high ﬁtness, and vari-
able dimensionality (Smith et al., 2002a). These properties put it
among the most difﬁcult class of search problems. Finally, because
it is a noisy real-world sensorimotor behavior-generating task, the
search space is likely to share some key properties with those of
natural brain-based behavior tasks. We should make it clear we
do not believe this is how neural networks actually develop. The
aim of this demonstration is to add to the molecular example an
example of a problem which contains a realistic behavioral ﬁtness
landscape.
The task used in the studies is illustrated in Figure 6. Starting
from an arbitrary position and orientation in a black-walled arena,
a robot equipped with a forward facing camera must navigate
under extremely variable lighting conditions to one shape (a white
triangle) while ignoring the second shape (a white rectangle). The
robot must successfully complete the task over a series of trials in
which the relative position and size of the shapes varies. Both the
robot control network and the robot sensor inputmorphology, i.e.,
the number and positions of the camera pixels used as input and
how they were connected into the network, were under evolution-
ary control as shown in Figure 6. Evolution took place in a special
validated simulation of the robot and its environment which made
use of Jakobi’s (1998) minimal simulation methodology whereby
computationally very efﬁcient simulations are built by modeling
only those aspects of the robot–environment interaction deemed
important to the desired behavior and masking everything else
with carefully structured noise (so that evolution could not come
to rely on any of those aspects). These ultra-fast, ultra-lean sim-
ulations allow very accurate transfer of behavior from simulation
to reality by requiring highly robust solutions that are able to cope
with a wide range of noisy conditions. The one used in this work
has been validated several times and transfer from simulation to
reality is extremely good. The trade-off in using such fast simula-
tions is that the search space is made more difﬁcult because of the
very noisy nature of the evaluations.
The robot nervous system consists of a GasNet. This form of
non-standard neural network has been used as it has previously
been shown to be more evolvable (in terms of evaluations required
to ﬁnd a good solution) and to produce search spaces with a high
degree of neutrality (Husbands et al., 1998, 2010; Philippides et al.,
2005). Hence the problem provides a very challenging but not
impossibly difﬁcult search space.
Details of the GasNet, the encoding used, and the ﬁtness func-
tion are found in the Appendix. Table 2 summarizes the results
of the comparison of search methods on the ER problem. The
FIGURE 6 | (Left): the gantry robot. A CCD camera head moves at the end
of a gantry arm. In the study referred to in the text 2D movement was used,
equivalent to a wheeled robot with a ﬁxed forward pointing camera. A
validated simulation was used: controllers developed in the simulation work at
least as well on the real robot. (Right): the simulated arena and robot. The
bottom right view shows the robot position in the arena with the triangle and
rectangle. Fitness is evaluated on how close the robot approaches the
triangle. The top right view shows what the robot “sees,” along with the pixel
positions selected by evolution for visual input. The bottom left view shows
how the genetically set pixels are connected into the control network whose
gas levels are illustrated. The top left view shows current activity of nodes in
the GasNet.
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Table 2 | Summary statistic for comparison of the search methods on
the ER problem.
Search alg Mean fitness Min fitness Max fitness STD fitness
DEA 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.0
SEA 0.821 0.666 1.00 0.267
RSHC 0.133 0.028 0.28 0.045
Greedy RSHC 0.1466 0.037 0.291 0.033
Neutral RSHC 0.149 0.066 0.208 0.030
Neut-50 RSHC 0.148 0.103 0.207 0.026
Kimura RSHC 0.0331 0.0034 0.087 0.025
PS_SHC 0.382 0.281 0.512 0.071
Mean, minimum, and average ﬁtness were calculated from the ﬁnal ﬁtnesses
achieved on each run of the various methods. Each method was run sufﬁcient
times to require 8 million ﬁtness evaluations.
maximum ﬁtness for the task is 1.0. The average ﬁtness for a ran-
domly generated solution (from which all methods start) is 0.0213
(from a random sample of 100,000). The statistics were gathered
over sufﬁcient runs of each method to require 8 million ﬁtness
evaluations, making the statistics particularly watertight.
DEAandSEAare population based (mutation-only) evolution-
ary algorithms, RSHC, and its variants are random start stochastic
hill-climbing algorithms, PS_SHC consists of a population of
independent stochastic hill-climbers in which selection is oper-
ating in order to allocate search resources. It is exactly the same
as the DEA algorithm except there is no replication. All the algo-
rithms make use of the same set of mutation operators to generate
new solutions (offspring). The search algorithms and mutation
operators are fully described in the Appendix.
Many variations of all these algorithms were explored (by vary-
ing all algorithmparameters, e.g.,mutation rates,maximumnum-
ber of iterations, populations sizes etc.) but the results were not
signiﬁcantly different so only the main representative algorithms
are shown here. The distributed population based evolutionary
algorithm, DEA, found a solution with a perfect score on every
run made (85 runs were needed to ensure the required 8 Million
ﬁtness evaluations). On many runs the evolutionary algorithm
found perfect solutions in less than 200 generations (20,000 ﬁt-
ness evaluations). Although signiﬁcantly worse than DEA, SEA
was able to ﬁnd perfect solutions on 55% of runs and reason-
ably good solutions on all runs. Each random start hill-climbing
method required many restarts (often more than 10,000) to secure
the 8 Million ﬁtness evaluations needed for comparison. Still none
of them were able to ﬁnd a good solution. PS_SHC produced bet-
ter solutions than the RSHC methods and in most runs rapidly
moved to areas of moderate ﬁtness but was never able to climb
to high ﬁtnesses. For further details of the statistical analysis of
results see the Appendix.
As the evolutionary algorithms did not use crossover, and all
methods used the same mutation functions to produce offspring
(new candidate solutions), the advantage of the evolutionary algo-
rithms must lie in their use of selection and replication within a
population. This allows partial information on several promising
search directions to be held at the same time. Selection allows
an automatic allocation of search resources that favors the most
promising directions, as represented by the ﬁttest individuals in the
population. This accounts for PS_SHC’s superior performance in
comparison with the RSHC methods, in particular its rapid move-
ment to moderate ﬁtness areas of the search space. However, it is
the combination of selection and replication that generates real
search power. Selection pushes search resources toward the cur-
rently most promising search directions and replication, biased
toward ﬁtter individuals, magniﬁes this effect by spreading higher
ﬁtness fronts throughout the population. Such processes are par-
ticularly effective in the DEA where distributed parallel search is
always going on at many fronts simultaneously. The geographical
distribution, in which local neighborhoods overlap, allows infor-
mation on promising search directions to rapidly diffuse around
the grid on which the population operate, without the need for
global control. Such processes are often at play in biological media,
which are by nature spatially distributed, and could plausibly oper-
ate in neural substrates. The population based distributed nature
of the evolutionary search was also instrumental in coping with
the high degree of noise in the ﬁtness evaluation. The population
is able to “smooth out” the noisy evaluation signal and progress to
the higher ﬁtness regions (Arnold and Beyer, 2003; Jin and Branke,
2005). Hill-climbing, with its use of a solitary solution at any one
time, could not cope with the noisy, unreliable feedback from the
evaluation function (even though it involved averaging over sev-
eral trials) and could never rise above the low-ﬁtness foothills and
neutral plains that occupy most of the search space.
PROPOSED NEURONAL UNITS OF EVOLUTION
Having seen two examples (the molecular and the neural) of the
relative efﬁciency of true evolutionary search, we are ready to pose
the question: do units of evolution in the brain exist after all? The
answer is that for the time being we do not know. Since neurons
do not reproduce, any realization of true Darwinian dynamics
beyond the synapse level must be subtle and easy to miss unless
sought after with the right paradigm in mind. Here we review
two candidatemechanisms for neuronal replication: one replicates
local connectivity patterns, the other propagates activity patterns.
These models are not for “ﬁtting curves” at this stage; rather, they
are meant to stimulate the development of speciﬁc models and
then experimental tests. They have the status of “toy models” in
that they are idealized and very simple.
Previously we have proposed a tentative outline of a means by
which a higher-order unit of neuronal evolution above the synap-
tic level may be able to replicate. The method allows a pattern of
synaptic connections to be copied from one such unit to another
as shown in Figure 7 (Fernando et al., 2008). Several variants of
the mechanism are possible, however the principle remains the
same; a copy is made by one neuronal (offspring) region under-
taking causal inference of the underlying connectivity of another
(parental) neuronal region based on the spike trains the parent
emits to the offspring region.
In the brain there are many topographic maps. These are path-
ways of parallel connections that preserve adjacency relationships
and they can act to establish a one-to-one (or at least a few-to-few)
transformation between neurons in distinct regions of the brain.
In addition there is a kind of synaptic plasticity called STDP, the
same kind of plasticity that Young et al. (2007) used to explain the
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FIGURE 7 | Outline of a mechanism for copying patterns of synaptic connections between neuronal groups.The pattern of connectivity from the lower
layer is copied to the upper layer. See text.
copying of receptive ﬁelds. It works rather like Hebbian learning.
Hebb (1949) said that neurons that ﬁre together wire together,
which means that the synapse connecting neuron A to neuron B
gets stronger if A and B ﬁre at the same time. However, recently it
has been discovered that there is an asymmetric form of Hebbian
learning (STDP) where if the pre-synaptic neuron A ﬁres before
the post-synaptic neuron B, the synapse is strengthened, but if
pre-synaptic neuron A ﬁres after post-synaptic neuron B then
the synapse is weakened. Thus STDP in an unsupervised man-
ner, i.e., without an explicit external teacher, reinforces potential
causal relationships. It is able to guesswhich synapseswere causally
implicated in a pattern of activation.
If a neuronal circuit exists in layer A in Figure 7, and is exter-
nally stimulated randomly to make its neurons spike, then due to
the topographic map from layer A to layer B, neurons in layer B
will experience similar spike pattern statistics as in layer A (due to
the topographic map). If there is STDP in layer B between weakly
connected neurons then this layer becomes a kind of causal infer-
ence machine that observes the spike input from layer A and tries
to produce a circuit with the same connectivity, or at least that
is capable of generating the same pattern of correlations. One
problem with this mechanism is that there are many possible pat-
terns of connectivity that generate the same spike statistics when
a circuit is randomly externally stimulated to spike. As the cir-
cuit size gets larger, due to the many possible paths that activity
can take through a circuit within a layer, the number of possible
equivalent circuits grows. This can be prevented by limiting the
amount of horizontal spread of activity permissible within a layer
(Hasselmo, 2006). Our early models used simple error-correction
neurons that undertook heterosynaptic depression to eliminate
false-positive and false-negative inferences, and using these we
found it was possible to evolve networks of 20–30 neurons in size
to obtain a particular desired pattern of connectivity. The network
with connectivity closest to the desired connectivity was allowed
to replicate itself to other circuits. Recently we have shown that
error-correction neurons are not needed if sub-threshold depo-
larization is used such that coincident spikes from the parent layer
and the offspring layer are required to activate an offspring layer
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neuron, Section “Details of a Modiﬁed Model for Copying of Pat-
terns of Synaptic Connectivity” in Appendix. Furthermore, use
of heterosynaptic competition rules and ﬁrst order STDP rules
(Nessler et al., 2009) allows causal disambiguation (Gopnik and
Schulz, 2004). Recently there has been evidence for this kind of
copying in neuronal cultures and in the hippocampus of rats nav-
igating routes in a maze (Isaac et al., 2009; Johnson et al., 2010).
Further work is required to identify the ﬁdelity of this copying
operation in neuronal cultures and slices to determine the size of
networks that may be copied by intra-brain causal inference.
Previously William Calvin had proposed that patterns of activ-
ity can replicate over hexagonal arrays that extend over the cor-
tex; however there is no evidence for the donut of activation
that is needed around each pyramidal cell for this mechanism
to properly work, and indeed no model has been produced to
demonstrate Calvin’s sketch (Calvin, 1987, 1996; Fernando and
Szathmáry, 2009, 2010). This was remedied in our recent paper
which proposed an even simpler method of activity replication
using bistable neurons, inhibitory gating, and topographic maps
(Fernando et al., 2010). This work combines Hebbian learn-
ing with the replication operation to allow learning of linkage
disequilibrium in a way that would not be possible in genetic
evolution. Aunger (2002) has also argued for true neuronal repli-
cation although has produced no model. Finally, John Holland
in his development of Learning Classiﬁer Systems had in mind
a cognitive implementation, but had proposed no model of such
an implementation (Holland, 1975; Holland and Reitman, 1977;
Holland et al., 1986) although recent work in learning classiﬁer
systems has done so (Fernando, 2011a,b). Our latest work shows
that paths taken by activity through a neuronal network can be
interpreted as units of evolution that overlap and that exhibit
mutation and crossover by activity dependent structural plasticity
(Fernando et al., 2011). Such units of evolution are serial Dar-
winian entities rather than parallel ones in the sense that their
phenotypes can only be expressed in series and not in parallel.
In all other respects they share the characteristics of units of
evolution.
CONCLUSION
Some circumstantial evidence for neuronal replicators exists. For
example it has been shown that neuronal response characteristics
can replicate. This involves the copying of a functional pattern of
input connections from one neuron to another neuron and is a
lower-boundary case of replication of synaptic connectivity pat-
terns in small neuronal circuits (Young et al., 2007). Further work
is required to examine to what extent more complex response
characteristics can be copied. There is evidence that connectivity
patterns can be entrained by stimuli (Johnson et al., 2010) and
that this can also occur during behavior (Isaac et al., 2009). These
mechanisms could be extended for copying of patterns of synap-
tic connectivity, and undertaking such experiments in neuronal
slices and cultures could test the NRH. Our proposal for the evo-
lution of neuronal paths is supported by increasing evidence for
activity dependent structural plasticity (Chklovskii et al., 2004).
In summary we have distinguished between selectionist and truly
Darwinian theories, and have proposed a truly Darwinian theory
of DarwinianNeurodynamics. The suggestion that trueDarwinian
evolution canhappen in thebrainduring, say, complex thinking,or
the development of language in children, is ultimately an empiri-
cal issue. Three possible outcomes are possible: (i) nothing beyond
the synapse level undergoes Darwinian evolution in the brain; (ii)
units of evolution will be identiﬁed that are very different from
our “toy model” suggestions in this paper (and elsewhere); and
(iii) some of the units correspond, with more complex details, to
our suggested neuronal replicators. The potential signiﬁcance of
the last two options cannot be overrated.
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APPENDIX
DETAILS OF COMPARISON OF EVOLUTIONARY SEARCH AND
HILL-CLIMBING METHODS ON A GasNet EVOLUTIONARY ROBOTICS
TASK
GasNets
GasNets make use of an analog of volume signaling, whereby neu-
rotransmitters freely diffuse into a relatively large volume around
a nerve cell, potentially affecting many other neurons irrespective
of whether or not they are electrically connected. By analogy with
biological neuronal networks, GasNets incorporate two distinct
signaling mechanisms, one “electrical” and one “chemical.” The
underlying “electrical” network is a discrete-time step, recurrent
neural network with a variable number of nodes. These nodes are
connected by either excitatory or inhibitory links. In addition to
this underlying network in which positive and negative “signals”
ﬂow between units, an abstract process loosely analogous to the
diffusion of gaseous modulators is at play. Some units can emit
virtual “gases” which diffuse and are capable of modulating the
behavior of other units by changing their transfer functions. The
networks occupy a 2D space; the diffusion processes mean that the
relative positioning of nodes is crucial to the functioning of the
network. A GasNet is illustrated in Figure A1.
The network architecture (including number of nodes and
how/if they are connected) and all properties of the nodes and
connections and gas diffusion parameters are set by the search
algorithm, along with which camera pixels are used as input.
Because of the noise and variation, and limited sensory capabilities
(generally only very few pixels are used), this task is challenging,
requiring robust, general solutions. The coevolution of network
and sensor morphology and the fact that the network does not
have a prespeciﬁed architecture makes this far from a simple “net-
work tuning” type problem. The search space has other interesting
properties that are often found in biological systems, particularly
Neuron 1
Neuron 2
Neuron 4
Neuron 3
Neuron 5
Neuron 6
A GasNet. Neuron 3 is emitting gas, and modulating
neuron 2 despite there being no synaptic connection.
FIGUREA1 | A basic GasNet showing excitatory (solid) and inhibitory
(dashed) “electrical” connections and a diffusing virtual gas creating a
“chemical” gradient.
that of degeneracy, in the sense discussed by Edelman and Gally
(2001). Analysis of GasNet solutions often reveals high levels of
degeneracy, with functionally equivalent sub-networks occurring
in many different forms, some involving gas and some not (Smith
et al., 2002b). Their genotype to phenotype mapping (where the
phenotype is robot behavior) is also highly degenerate with many
different ways of achieving the same outcome (e.g., moving node
positions, changing gas diffusion parameters, adding new con-
nections, or deleting existing ones can all have the same effect).
This is especially true considering variable length genotypes are
used to efﬁciently sculpt solutions in a search space of variable
dimensions. These properties partly explain the robustness and
adaptability of GasNets in noisy environments as well as their
evolvability (there are many paths to the same phenotypical out-
come with reduced probabilities of lethal mutations; Philippides
et al., 2005). See Husbands et al. (2010) for a detailed discus-
sion of the properties of the networks and their resultant search
spaces.
Network encoding
Networks were encoded on a variable sized genotype coding for
a variable number of nodes. A genotype consisted of an array of
integer variables, each lying in the range (0, 100). For continu-
ous variables, the phenotype value is obtained by normalizing the
genotype value to lie in the range (0.0, 1.0) and multiplying by the
relevant variable range. For nominal values, such as whether or
not the node has a visual input, the phenotype value= genotype
value MOD N nom,where N nom is the number of possible nominal
values, and MOD is the binary modular division operator. Each
node in the network has 21 variables associated with it. These
deﬁne the node’s position on a 2D plane; how the node connects
to other nodes on the plane with either excitatory (weight =+1)
or inhibitory (weight=−1) connections; whether or not the node
has visual input, and if it does the coordinates of the camera pixel
it takes input from, along with a threshold below which input
is ignored; whether or not the node has a recurrent connection;
whether and under what circumstances the node can emit a gas
and if so which gas it emits; and a series of variables describing the
gas emission dynamics (maximum range, rate of emission, and
decay etc). All variables were under evolutionary control. Four
of the nodes are assigned as motor nodes (forward and backward
nodes for the left and right motor,with motor speeds proportional
to the output of the relevant forward node minus the output of
the relevant backward node). See Husbands et al. (1998, 2010) for
further details.
Formally:
<genotype>::(<gene>)∗
<gene>::<x><y><Rp><TH1p><TH2p><Rn><TH1n>
<TH2n><visin><visr>
<visθ><visthr><rec><TE><CE><s><Re><index
0><bias>
Fitness function
Sixteen evaluations were carried out on an individual network,
with scores fi calculated on the fraction of the initial robot-triangle
distance that the robot moves toward the triangle by the end of
the evaluation; a maximum score of 1.0 is obtained by getting the
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robot center to within 10.0 cm of the triangle at any time dur-
ing the evaluation (this requires the outside of the robot to get
very close to the target). The controller only receives visual input;
reliably getting to the triangle over a series of trials with differ-
ent starting conditions, different relative positions of the triangle
and rectangle, and under very noisy lighting, can only be achieved
by visual identiﬁcation of the triangle. The evaluated scores are
ranked, and the ﬁtness F is the weighted sum of the N = 16 scores,
with weight proportional to the inverse ranking i (ranking is from
1 to N, with N as the lowest score):
F =
∑N
i=1 ifi∑N
i=1 i
= 2
N (N + 1)
N∑
i=1
ifi
Note the higher weighting on the poorer scores provides pres-
sure to do well on all evaluations; a solution scoring 50% on every
evaluation has ﬁtness nearly four times that of one scoring 100%
on half of the evaluations and zero on the other half.
Mutation operators
The basic search operators available to all the search methods used
in the study are the following mutation operators:
Gaussian mutation. Each integer in the genotype string had a
x% probability of mutation in a Gaussian distribution around
its current value with a variance of 10% of the range of the gene
values. x is a control parameter for the algorithm and was typically
set at 10.
Random uniform mutation. Each integer in the genotype string
had a y% probability of mutation in a uniform distribution across
the full range of the gene. y is a control parameter for the algo-
rithm and was typically set at 2. The combination of Gaussian
mutation at a relatively high rate and random uniform mutation
at a relatively low rate is found to be very effective combination.
Neuron addition operator. An addition operator, with a z%
chance per genotype of adding one neuron to the network by
inserting a block of random gene values describing each of the
new node’s properties. z is a control parameter for the algorithm
and was typically set at 4.
Neuron deletion operator. A deletion operator, also with a z%
chance per genotype of deleting one randomly chosen neuron from
the network by removing the entire block of genes associated with
it. The addition and deletion operators allowed exploration of a
variable dimension space. The default starting number of nodes
in a network was 10 which could then shrink (to a minimum of
six) or grow (without limit) as the search proceeded. The search
was always operating in a space of more than 100 dimensions
and those good solutions that were found typically had 200–300
dimensions.
Each of the search algorithms generated new candidate solu-
tions (offspring) by applying all the operators according to the
probability distributions described.
Search methods
RSHC is a basic random start hill-climber. N random mutations
of the current solution are created and the ﬁttest of these is chosen
as the new solution, unless no better solution is found. This is
repeated until P cycles have run without any improvement in
ﬁtness.At that point the hill-climber starts again from anewly gen-
erated random point (a new“run” for generating the performance
statistics). Various values of N and P were explored with very little
difference in performance found as long as N > 50 and P > 100.
The values in the table were generated for N = 100, P = 1000.
Greedy RSHC is similar to RSHC but with N = 1. Mutations
are continually generated until a better solution is found. In this
case P = 5000.
Neutral RSHC is the same as Greedy RSHC except that neutral
moves are taken. If the ﬁtness of the mutated copy is the same or
better than the current solution, it is accepted as the new current
solution. This allows neutral net crawling (Barnett, 2001). Because
of the noisy nature of the ﬁtness evaluation, statistical neutrality
is used (ﬁtnesses within a statistically deﬁned band around the
current ﬁtness are accepted as “equal” ﬁtness; Smith et al., 2003).
Neutral-50RSHC is the same asNeutral RSHCexcept that there
is now only a 50% chance of accepting a neutral move in the search
space.
Kimura RSHC is a random start hill-climber that uses a prob-
ability of accepting a move based on a Kimura distribution:
P(a)= 1− e2S/1− e2NKS, where P(a) is the probability of accept-
ing a new solution as the next point to move to, S = (Fo − Fp)/Fp,
Fo = ﬁtness of offspring,Fp = ﬁtness of parent,N = effective pop-
ulation size, K is a control parameter. Many different values for
N and K were investigated, but there was no signiﬁcant dif-
ference between them. The results in the table are for N = 100
and K = 1.
DEA is a geographically distributed mutation-only evolution-
ary algorithm with local selection and replacement. This parallel
asynchronous algorithm uses a population size of 100 arranged on
a 10× 10 grid. Parents are chosen through rank-based roulette-
wheel selection on the pool consisting of the eight nearest neigh-
bors to a randomly chosen grid-point. A mutated copy of the
parent is placed back in the pool using inverse rank-based roulette-
wheel selection (De Jong, 2006). The algorithm is run until a per-
fect score (1.0) is achieved for 10 consecutive pseudo-generation or
until 3000 pseudo-generation have passed. A pseudo-generation
occurs every N mutation (offspring) events, where N is the
population size. See Husbands et al. (1998) for full details.
SEA is a simple, generational genetic algorithm in which the
entire population (except the ﬁttest member) is replaced on each
generation. Roulette-wheel selection is used to pick a parent which
produces a mutated offspring for the next generation. A popula-
tion size of 100 was used. The algorithm is run until a perfect
score (1.0) is achieved for 10 consecutive generations or until 3000
generations have passed.
PS_SHC consists of a population of independent stochastic
hill-climbers in which selection is operating in order to allocate
search resources. It is exactly the same as theDEA algorithm except
there is no replication and if an individual is selected (according
to ﬁtness) to be mutated (a single search move), and its offspring
is ﬁtter, the offspring replaces the parent (rather than another
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member of the population). This means there is no diffusion of
genetic material around the population grid. Variations of this
algorithm allowing neutral moves and (with a low probability)
replacement of parents with lower ﬁtness offspring were also tried.
These variants did not produce signiﬁcantly different results.
Statistical analysis of results
A statistical analysis of the comparative study summarized in
Table 2 was carried out. A Kruskal–Wallis test performed on
the whole data set revealed highly signiﬁcant differences between
the distributions (p < 10−18). Pair-wise Wilcoxon rank-sum tests,
adjusted for multiple comparisons using the Dunn–Sidak proce-
dure for controlling type-1 statistical errors (Hollander andWolfe,
1999), were used to further probe the differences between the
distributions. As can easily be seen from the table, DEA was signif-
icantly better than all other algorithms including SEA (p  10−6
in all cases), SEA was signiﬁcantly better than all the hill-climbing
algorithms (p < 10−6) and PS_SHC was signiﬁcantly better than
all other hill-climbers (p < 10−6) but signiﬁcantly worse than both
the evolutionary search algorithms. There was no signiﬁcant dif-
ferences between the RSHC methods except the one using the
Kimura distribution which is signiﬁcantly worse. The main dif-
ference between the random start hill-climbing methods was the
length of typical individual hill climbs before a new random restart
is triggered (due to lackof progress). SimpleRSHChad the shortest
individual climbs (typically 500moves),while the neutralmethods
had the longest (typically 5,000 moves).
DETAILS OF A MODIFIED MODEL FOR COPYING OF PATTERNS OF
SYNAPTIC CONNECTIVITY
We demonstrate a novel mechanism for copying of topology that
does not require explicit error-correction neurons. A causal net-
work (Bayes net) is learned on the basis of spikes received from
another causal network. Each node in the causal network consists
of a group of neurons (unconnected within a group). Neurons are
fully connected between groups. Each node is constituted by n = 5
stochastic neurons that are activated on the basis of a linear sum
of weighted synaptic inputs put through a sigmoid (logistic) func-
tion. Directed synaptic connections between neurons will come to
describe causal interdependencies between events. The probability
that a neuron ﬁres pﬁre is given by Eq. A1.
pi = 1
1 + e−bias+
∑
wji sj
(A1)
where sj is the state of an afferent neuron j (i.e., 0 or 1) and wji is
the synaptic weight from pre-synaptic neuron j to post-synaptic
neuron i. The state of neurons is updated every millisecond based
on this calculation. A neuron cannot ﬁre for a refractory period of
10ms after it has ﬁred already.
Inputs to the network arise from perceptual processes or from
other brain regions. Each distinct event type (shown in FigureA2)
may activate a speciﬁc set of neurons in the causal network (top)
via an input neuron (bottom), as assumed in previous models of
STDP based Bayesian learning (Nessler et al., 2009). Each set of
causal network neurons initially has weak connections to all other
sets of causal network neurons, but has no connections to neurons
within the same set. Why do we assume that many causal network
neurons are used to represent one event? This allows the network
to deal with low ﬁdelity transmission from the input neuron (bot-
tom) to each causal network neuron (top) because the probability
that at least one causal network neuron ﬁres when the input neu-
ron ﬁres will be 1− (1− p)n, where n is the number of neurons
in the set of neurons that represents an event. The weak connec-
tions between sets of causal network neurons can be interpreted as
representing the initial prior expectation of a causal relationship
between events. To be speciﬁc, in the simulation this expectation is
as follows; if a pre-synaptic neuron ﬁres then there is a probability
of 0.0009 that a post-synaptic neuron will ﬁre. Activity can pass
between neurons with delays ranging from 0 to 4ms, as shown in
Figure 1. That is, between any two neurons that represent two dif-
ferent events, a connection exists that links these events by a delay
of either 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4ms. The range of delays between sets is set
up so that all possible delays exist between two sets of neurons.
This range of delays is intended to match the characteristic delays
between neurons in the CA3 region of the Hippocampus (Miles,
1990). The connectivity in Figure 1 is entirely plausible. It only
assumes that there exist connections from the hippocampus to the
cortex such that there is at least a disjoint set of neurons receiving
inputs from hippocampal neurons that represent distinct events,
and that there exists a range of delays between cortical neurons
within the same region.
In the simulation shown, the part of the neuronal network
that entrains to form the causal network consists of 15 neurons
arranged into three sets of ﬁve. Each set receives inputs from a
separate input neuron from the input layer. Neurons from each
set are connected all-to-all to neurons in the other two sets. Each
neuron in a set sends connections with delays 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4ms
to the ﬁve neurons in each other set. This means that all possible
conﬁgurations of delay from 0 to 4ms in a three-node network are
represented in the initial network.
A neuron in the causal network must be depolarized simul-
taneously by intrinsic causal network neurons and by extrin-
sic input neurons for it to have a high probability of ﬁring a
spike. As shown in Figure 1, external “perceptual” input from
the input neuron to its set of causal network neurons is sub-
threshold (5.25) which means that if the input neuron ﬁres,
there is only a low probability (0.014) that any causal network
neuron within its set ﬁres. Only when extrinsic spikes reach a
causal network neuron at the same time as intrinsic spikes from
another causal network neuron is the probability of the post-
synaptic neuron ﬁring increased to at least 0.15. This is an order
of magnitude greater than with unsynchronized reception of
intrinsic and extrinsic spikes. This principle of dependence on
two sources of activation for ﬁring is also to be found in more
detailed neuronal models that simulate intrinsic synaptic con-
nections within a population as fast inhibitory (GABA) and fast
excitatory (AMPA) connections, but between-population connec-
tions asmodulatory (NMDA) synapses (Friston, 2000). These later
synapses are voltage-dependent such that they have no effect on
the intrinsic dynamics in the second population unless there is
already a substantial degree of depolarization. Whilst those mod-
els are intended to show attentional top-down modulation of
bottom-up driving connections (Friston and Buchel, 2000), here
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FIGUREA2 | Overall structure of a two-cause causal network (above) and
its inputs that represent two event types (below).The bias of causal
network neurons is set to 9.5. As shown on the graph below, this means that
external input alone (at ﬁxed synaptic weight 5.25) causes a neuron in the
causal network to ﬁre with probability only 0.014. However, if external input is
simultaneous with internal delay line input from another causal network
neuron, then the neuron will ﬁre with probability 0.15 (given the initial internal
delay line synaptic weight of 2.5). If a causal delay line has been potentiated to
its maximum (ACh depressed) weight of 4.0, then simultaneous external and
internal inputs to a neuron will cause it to ﬁre with probability 0.43. However,
internal delay line activation alone (without simultaneous external input) is
insufﬁcient to make a neuron ﬁre with any greater than probability 0.004 (even
at the maximum internal ACh depressed weight of 4.0). This arrangement
insures that simultaneous input from external events and internal delay lines
is an order of magnitude more likely to cause a neuron to ﬁre than
unsynchronized inputs from either source alone. This non-linearity is essential
in training of the causal network because it means that only connections that
mirror the delays between received events are potentially strengthened.
we are concernedwith how intrinsic connections (within a cortical
region) are entrained by extrinsic inputs from the hippocampus
(Nadel and Moscovitch, 1997; Nadel et al., 2000, 2007). We do
not consider neuromodulation explicitly, although the addition
of neuromodulation may well be expected to improve causal
inference performance.
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Next we describe the rules that determine synaptic weight
change in the causal network. Three plasticity rules were mod-
eled; ﬁrst order STDP, ﬁrst order long-term depression (LTD), and
a (Rescorla–Wagner type) heterosynaptic competition rule. The
use of ﬁrst order rules was ﬁrst considered by Nessler et al. (2009)
and we are grateful to the group of Wolfgang Maass for suggesting
the use of such rules.
The ﬁrst plasticity rule is a subtle modiﬁcation of STDP (Song
and Abbott, 2001; Izhikevich, 2007). The modiﬁcation made to
STDP here is that the weight change is obtained by multiplying
the current weight by the standard STDP term, i.e., the absolute
extent of weight change is related to the current weight by a ﬁrst
order dependence such that the weight experiences exponential
autocatalytic growth and decay in a manner identical to that
observed in asexual biological replicators (Adams, 1998; Zachar
and Szathmáry, 2010). This is until a maximum weight threshold
is reached which can be interpreted as a equivalent to a carry-
ing capacity in a population dynamic model. We are intentionally
choosing to see the change in synaptic as a kind of unit of evo-
lution or replicator (Fernando and Szathmáry, 2009, 2010). An
alternative is to use a sub-exponential (e.g., parabolic) growth
rule dw/dt= kwp where p < 1 that does not result in survival of
the ﬁttest but survival of everybody, a modiﬁcation which may
allow preservation of synaptic diversity (Szathmary, 2000; Szath-
máry, 2006). For the time beingwe use a simple exponentialmodel
with p = 1.
The second plasticity rule we simulate is a pair of ﬁrst order
long-term depression (LTD) rules that can work with neuronal
network models that are sufﬁciently realistic to include explicit
delays between a spike leaving the body of a neuron and reaching
the synapse. Firstly, if the pre-synaptic neuron ﬁres and if when the
spike reaches the synapse the post-synaptic neuron does not ﬁre,
then the synaptic weight experiences ﬁrst order depression, i.e.,
the weight is reduced by a ﬁxed proportion of its current value.
This embodies the intuitive notion that if event A occurs but event
B does not occur when it should have occurred if event A were to
have caused it, then event A is naturally less likely to have caused
event B with that particular delay. Note that if the STDP rule were
used alone then there would be no weight change because the
STDP rule produces maximum weight change for spikes that co-
occur close together in time, but not where only one spike occurs.
Secondly when a post-synaptic neuron ﬁres, those synapses that
precisely at that time are not being reached by spikes from their
respective pre-synaptic neurons have their weights depressed by a
ﬁxed proportion of their current values. This embodies the intu-
itive causal notion that if effect B occurs and yet putative cause
A did not occur at the right time before B, then cause A is less
likely to have caused effect B. In both cases the synapse experi-
ences exponential decay. Both rules reﬁne the STDP rule in the
sophistication of causal assumptions they embody. Both causal
assumptions seem entirely natural and intuitive at the cognitive
level. Note again that if STDP were simulated as for example in
Izhikevich (2007) thenweight changewould only occurwhen both
pre- and post-synaptic neurons ﬁred, in other words, changes to
causal assumptions could only be made when both potential cause
and effect were observed, but not when only one or the other was
observed. It is LTD of the type described above that occurs when
only one of the events occurs and it is essential for explaining the
phenomenon of backward blocking (Gopnik and Schulz, 2004;
Gopnik et al., 2004).
The third plasticity rule is a competitive rule that redistrib-
utes synaptic weights if two synapses are simultaneously active.
This implements synaptic competition between simultaneously
active synapses for weight resources, and it implements screening
off behavior. If two pre-synaptic neurons activate a post-synaptic
neuron simultaneously, they compete for synaptic resources, in a
manner analogous to ecological competition dynamics between
two species competing for the same food resource (Hofbauer and
Sigmund, 1998). This rule embodies the natural causal assump-
tion that if two potential causes occur together that they should
compete for explanatory weight. In a sense, this is the synaptic
implementation of Occum’s razor which prevents the needless
multiplication of causal entities. Competition between simultane-
ously co-occurring events for causal inﬂuence,but in the two-cause
condition there is no competition between events.
Finally, we assume that during the training phase there is a
high level of ACh based neuromodulation that reduces the effec-
tive synaptic transmission between weights between neurons in
the causal network. This is modeled simply by multiplying the
weights in the causal network by a factor< 1, such that the max-
imum permissible weight is 4, which translates to the probability
of 0.004 that a post-synaptic neuron ﬁres given a pre-synaptic
neuron has ﬁred. This limit means that it is typically necessary
for a post-synaptic causal network neuron to receive simultaneous
activation from the input neuron, and from a causal network neu-
ron in order for it to have a high probability of ﬁring, i.e., there
is a kind of associative control based on sub-threshold depolar-
ization (Bush et al., 2010). In the simulation we implement an
upper weight bound which suddenly cuts off further exponential
growth, although a more realistic assumption may have been to
implement resource limitation resulting in a sigmoidal synaptic
growth function.
The details of the implementation are as follows. Initial synap-
tic weights within the causal network are all initialized at 2.5mV
which gives a very low probability that the post-synaptic neu-
ron will ﬁre if one pre-synaptic neuron ﬁres, see Figure 1. The
input weights to the causal network are ﬁxed at 5.25 that cor-
responds to a probability of 0.014 that a post-synaptic neuron
will ﬁre if it receives input only from one external input neu-
ron. However, if external input is simultaneous with internal
delay line input from another causal network neuron, then the
neuron will ﬁre with probability 0.15 (given the initial internal
delay line synaptic weight of 2.5). Synaptic weights are main-
tained in the range (0:wmax) where wmax = 4mV during ACh
depression, and 20mV without ACh depression. If a causal delay
line has been potentiated to its maximum (ACh depressed)
weight of 4.0, then simultaneous external and internal inputs
to a neuron will cause it to ﬁre with probability 0.43. How-
ever, internal delay line activation alone (without simultaneous
external input) is insufﬁcient to make a neuron ﬁre with any
greater than probability 0.004 (even at the maximum internal ACh
depressed weight of 4.0). The bias of causal network neurons is
set to 9.5mV that gives them a low probability of spontaneous
ﬁring.
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First order STDP
The STDP rule works as follows: τ is the time difference in mil-
liseconds between pre- and post-synaptic spiking. The standard
STDP rule is to allow the weight of a synapse to change according
to the standard implementation of additive STDP shown in Eq.
A1 below (Song et al., 2000; Izhikevich and Desai, 2003).
STDP (τ) = A+
(
1 − 1
τ+
)τ
for τ > 0
STDP (τ) = A−
(
1 − 1
τ−
)−τ
for τ ≤ 0
(A2)
The parameters A+ and A− effectively correspond to the max-
imum possible change in the synaptic weight per spike pair, while
τ+ and τ− denote the time constants of exponential decay for
potentiation and depression increments respectively. Typically τ+
and τ− = 20ms, and A+ = 1.0 and A− = 1.5. If a pre-synaptic
spike reaches the post-synaptic neuron (taking into account
conduction delays) before the post-synaptic neuron ﬁres, then
STDP(τ) is positive. If a pre-synaptic spike reaches a post-synaptic
neuron after it ﬁres, then STDP(τ) is negative. This STDP rule is
based on data from cultures of hippocampal pyramidal neurons
(Bi and Poo, 1998). However, more complex activity dependent
plasticity dynamics have been observed (Buchanan and Mellor,
2010).
The above rule is approximated by a simpliﬁed version of
the STDP rule where for all values of −10> τ<= 0, i.e., where
the pre-synaptic neuron ﬁres after the post-synaptic neuron, the
weight is depressed by 0.8 multiplied by the current weight, i.e.,
the weight is decreased by 20% of its existing value. If 10> τ> 0
then the existing weight is multiplied by 1.2, i.e., is increased by
20% of its current value.
First order LTD
Two types of ﬁrst order short-term depression are simulated. The
ﬁrst reduces the synaptic weight by 2% of its current weight
if the pre-synaptic neuron ﬁres and post-synaptic neuron does
not ﬁre. The second reduces the synaptic weight by 0.2% if
the post-synaptic neuron ﬁres and the pre-synaptic neuron does
not ﬁre.
Heterosynaptic competition rule
If two pre-synaptic neurons i and j simultaneously activate a post-
synaptic neuron p then the new weight wjp =wjp − 0.6wip and
wip =wip − 0.6wjp. That is, the existing weight is decreased by a
ﬁrst order term that is proportional to the weights of the other
simultaneously active synapses to that post-synaptic neuron p.
Results
If the output of one neuronal network that is activated randomly
by background neuronal noise can be observed by another net-
work at another location in the brain, then it can be copied. Using
our new mechanism, not only can the structure be copied, but the
delays can also be copied. We show that this observing network,
which we will call the “offspring” network, can undertake causal
inference on the ﬁrst network, which we will call the “parental”
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FIGUREA3 | Successful copying of common-cause, common-effect, and causal chain networks with all delay combinations from 1 to 4ms.The
“parental” network is stimulated randomly and the resulting spikes are passed to the “offspring” network by a topographic map.
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network. If we can successfully demonstrate the capacity for one
neuronal network to copy the temporal and causal relationships
that exist between other neurons elsewhere in the brain, then we
have identiﬁed a novel potential substrate of neuronal information
storage and transmission at the level above that of the synapse, i.e.,
the neuronal group.
The idea of copying of neuronal topology has been proposed
before, however the authors were not able to demonstrate effec-
tive copying in the case where transmission between neurons
involves non-uniform delays. Also even with uniform delays,
error-correction neurons were needed to prevent false-positive
and false-negative causal inferences (Fernando et al., 2008). The
mechanisms described here are able to entrain networks to learn
speciﬁc delays without the need for error-correction neurons. This
represents a signiﬁcant step in the development of the neuronal
replicator hypothesis which proposes that units of evolution exist
in the brain and can copy themselves from one brain region to
another (Fernando et al., 2008).
The ability of one causal network to infer the connectiv-
ity of another causal network was demonstrated by randomly
sparsely stimulating the parental causal network which is assumed
to consist of only three neurons equivalent to the input neu-
rons used in the previous experiments. Sparse stimulation means
any uniform external stimulate rate of the parental network that
does not impose signiﬁcant correlation artifacts between neu-
ronal ﬁrings, e.g., 10Hz. Figure A3 shows the successful copy-
ing of common-cause, common-effect, and causal chain net-
works with all possible combinations of integer delays from
1 to 4ms.
The same synaptic plasticity rules can be used to infer recurrent
network structures, see Figure A4. One-cycles and two-cycles of
delays up to 4ms are not detected by the causal inference mecha-
nism due to the refractory period of 10ms. However, three-cycles
of 4ms are inferred correctly because by the time activation passes
back to the initially stimulated neuron that neuron can again be
activated.
A motif thought to be of some signiﬁcance is the feedforward
“loop” (Sporns and Kotter, 2004). Again, due to the refractory
period there are regions in delay space for the feedforward “loop”
that are not correctly causally inferred, see Figure A5, however, in
most cases it is possible to copy the“loop.”Altogether these results
show that it is possible for the plasticity mechanisms described to
not only infer acyclic graphs but cycling graphs with delays.
The demonstration given here that causal inference between
one brain region and another that can occur by one network
observing the intrinsic dynamics that occurs during sparse stimu-
FIGUREA4 | One-, two-, and three-neuron cycles. Only if the cycle has a
period greater than the refractory period of the neurons within it can the
cycle be inferred. For example three-cycles with 4ms delays can be inferred
when the refractory period is 10ms.
lation suggests a new role for spontaneous activity in the brain
(Mazzoni et al., 2007), i.e., allowing the replication of synap-
tic connectivity patterns within a neuronal group to other brain
regions.
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Feedforward Loops 
FIGUREA5 | Feedforward loops (FFLs) with a sample of delays. Some regions in delay space cannot be properly inferred. Light red circles mark synapse
sets that were not strengthened when they should have been, i.e., false-negatives.
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